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A DISSENT FROM THE MIRANDA DISSENTS:
SOME COMMENTS ON THE "NEW" FIFTH
AMENDMENT AND THE OLD
"VOLUNTARINESS" TEST
Yale Kamisar*
The world and the books are so accustomed to use, and over-use,
the word "new" in connection with our country, that we early get
and permanently retain the impression that there is nothing old
about it.-Mark Twain (1883)1
[F]or the very reason that those in authority have no right to require a disclosure, those without authority feel justified in seeking
to worm it out by threats, by fraud, by holding out false hopes, by
putting forward false pretenses... Unwilling to allow a magistrate
to institute, as a matter of course, a formal examination, and place
the result on record, we leave the same information to be fished for
by the sheriff who makes the arrest, by the jailer, by the fellowprisoner turned informer or by the detective in disguise, and only
require the witness who proves it to add perhaps perjury to fraud
in swearing that no undue means were used to elicit the confession.-Simeon E. Baldwin (1883)2

I

Fthe several conferences and workshops (and many lunch con-

versations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I
have participated this past summer 3 are any indication, Miranda v.
Arizona' has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among
judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such
reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and
relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this

0 Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
The author is indebted to Steven Brodsky, a second-year student at the University
of Michigan Law School, for his valuable research assistance.
1. MARK TwAIN, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI ch. I (1883).
2. Simeon E. Baldwin, Paper Read at Sixth Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association, printed in 6 A.B.A. REP,. 225, 232 (1883).
S. For example, on the basis of four lively workshop sessions, lasting three full
hours, with the Chief Justices of the States at the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the
Conference of Chief Justices, August 5, 1966, I would have to say they were overwhelmingly opposed to the recent confession rulings.
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Warren, C.J.). Actually, "the Miranda opinion" is an
opinion for four cases: Miranda, No. 759; Vignera v. New York, No. 760; Westover
v. United States, No. 761; and California v. Stewart, No. 584. Justices Harlan, Stewart
and White dissented in all four cases, joining in separate dissenting opinions written
by Justices Harlan and White. Justice Clark, who would continue to follow the
"totality of circumstances" rule but assign increased weight to whether the appropriate warnings were given, see 384 U.S. at 499, 503, 504, dissented in three of the
four cases but concurred in the result in California v. Stewart "if the merits are
to be reached," id. at 504. (He preferred to dismiss the writ of certiorari in Stewart
for want of a final judgment.)
[591
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period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important
that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions
do not escape attention.
I must agree with Justice Harlan that "the fine points of this
[the Miranda majority's] scheme are far less clear than the Court
admits," 5 but I mean to treat this in another article. I do not deny
that some aspects of the majority opinion are questionable, for
example its defining "custodial questioning" 6-which must be
preceded by warning the suspect that "he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed" 7-to include stopping and questioning on the street. 8 I take it, however, that one may sharply dis5. 384 U.S. at 505. A number of questions about the reach of Miranda are raised
& KAMISAR, MODERN CRIINAL PROCEDURE 450 (2d ed. 1966).
6. See note 43 infra and accompanying text.
7. 384 U.S. at 444. This appears in the self-styled summary of the Court's holding.
The warnings (and the reasons for them) are discussed in considerable detail at
pp. 467-79 of the majority opinion.
8. Thus, although, as Judge Breitel had pointed out on the eve of Miranda, the
controversy had centered on what rights the suspect enjoyed and what rights he was
entitled to after he was brought to the police station, Breitel, Criminal Law and
Criminal Justice, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 1, 8-9, the Court manifested its willingness to
enter a thicket "largely ignored by commentators and dealt with ambiguously by
most courts." Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, in
PoLICE PowER AND INDIVIDUAL FR.EDOM 11, 15 (Sowle ed. 1962).
The Court has had much experience with police station interrogation (if anything, too much), but so far as I know it has never had occasion to consider the
admissibility of a statement produced by "on the street" or "on the spot" questioning.
I am convinced that the persistent, resourceful, skillful police interrogator is no
bogyman, but he operates within the confines of the stationhouse, not on the streets
or even in the squad car. The average patrolman is of a different breed. I am readily
persuaded by what the Court has to say about the substantial pressures generated
by the isolation, secrecy and unfamiliarity of the "interrogation room," but the
Court has virtually nothing to say about the inherently compulsive and menacing
nature of "on the street" questioning.
I agree that the privilege protects an individual from being compelled to incriminate himself even though the compulsion be "informal" and "subtle" and that
the privilege "does not distinguish degrees of incrimination," 384 U.S. at 476-once
a certain degree is reached. Distinguishing degrees, after all, is inherent in the process
of defining "compel" within the meaning of the privilege. That the requisite degree
will sometimes be reached in the course of "field interrogation" I have no doubt.
But always? Necessarily? Typically? Of course any questioning by a police officer
anywhere generates some pressures and anxieties--"what on their face are merely
words of request take on color from the officer's uniform, badge, gun and demeanor."
Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, in
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 29, 30 (Sowle ed. 1962). This is also true,
however, of "general on-the-scene questioning" and of police visits at a suspect's home
or place of business, situations where, the Court tells us, the requisite warnings need
not (or, at least, need not always) be given, because "the compelling atmosphere
inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present."
384 U.S. at 478.
in

HALL
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sent from portions of the Miranda dissents without warmly endorsing every aspect of the majority opinion. I take it that here, as

elsewhere, one may spot the bad without committing himself to,
or knowing, the perfectly good.9
Dissenting Justice Harlan, joined by Justices White and Stewart,
utters a couple of "hurrahs" for the old test-"a workable and ef-

fective means of dealing with confessions in a judicial manner"'1
and "an elaborate, sophisticated and sensitive approach to admissi-

bility of confessions."" The aim of the majority, he protests, "is
Finally, if the police must issue the Miranda warnings to one detained "on the
spot," they are more likely to resort to the more drastic alternative of taking him
down to the stationhouse. A stop may well be an "arrest" for some purposes, but it
does not stigmatize a man the way a formal "arrest" for a felony does.
On the other hand, this is surely one of those "damned if it did" (cover field
interrogation) and "damned if it didn't" issues which sometimes confront the Court.
As the Court must have been well aware, confining the Miranda rules to stationhouse proceedings-which would have sufficed to dispose of all the cases before itwould have put enormous pressure on the police to intensify and widen the less
visible "on the street" detention and to slow down or make more circuitous the
ride to headquarters. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 5.01, comment at 174 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79
HAIv. L. REv. 935, 945 (1966). By defining "custodial questioning" to cover "field"
and "squad car" questioning, the Court was understandably reaching out (albeit
most gingerly) to protect its flanks. For drama and glamor it is hard to beat the
"interrogation room" confession, but the "more humdrum" common practice of
stopping and questioning raises "far more basic" issues. See Packer, Who Can Police
the Police?, The New York Review of Books, Sept. 8, 1966, pp. 10, 12.
True, the Court might have taken a "middle ground" on this troublesome duster
of issues and indicated that whether questioning of a person "deprived of his freedom in any significant way" is to be preceded by the requisite warnings should turn
on the particular circumstances attending each incident, but to do so might have
largely defeated its central purpose, which was to displace the unsatisfactory caseby-case approach in this field with a set of firm, specific, "automatic" guidelines.
(The effects of its apparent exceptions for "general on-the-scene questioning" and
police visits at a suspect's home remain to be seen.)
If the distinctions between "field interrogation" and "police station" questioning
are without a difference for purposes of the requisite warnings, are they nevertheless
significant for purposes of "waiver"? Is the "heavy burden" resting on the government to demonstrate that the suspect knowingly and intelligently waived his rights,
384 US. at 475, appreciably lighter outside the relatively controlled environment of
the stationhouse? Considering the greater confusion and higher incidence of "emergency situations" on the street, the substantially greater pressures usually operating
in the police station, and the much more extensive means of corroborating evidence
of warnings available there, much can be said for an affirmative answer. However,
I do not find the answer in Miranda. Although I doubt that all those reading the
Miranda opinion with a magnifying glass can be restrained from expounding in the
meantime, this aspect of Miranda, above all others, will be brought into focus only
by "new prodding of the new facts." Cf. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION

293 (1960).
9. Cf. FuExR, THE MORALITY OF LAW 11-12 (1964).
10. 384 U.S. at 506.
11. Id. at 508. Justice Clark, too, although he maintains that "the majority . . .
goes too far on too little, while my dissenting brethren do not go quite far enough,"
id. at 499, retains considerable enthusiasm for the old approach:
Rather than employing the arbitrary Fifth Amendment rule which the Court
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toward 'voluntariness' in a utopian sense." 12 I submit that it is the
dissenters who are the dreamers, not the majority. I venture to say
that only one with an extravagant faith in the actual operation of
the "totality of the circumstances" test could fail to see that the
13
safeguards provided by the old test were largely "illusory."' Justice
Harlan is distressed that the majority requires the police to show
"voluntariness with a vengeance,"' 14 but I submit that, as his vote
to uphold the confession in Davis v. North Carolina'5 well illustrates, he would require the defendant to establish restraint, coercion and a breaking of the will "with a vengeance."
A victim of objectionable interrogation practices could only
satisfy this test with some regularity in a utopian judicial world.
This was not Davis' world. He could produce a specific notation on
the arrest sheet to the effect that he was to be held incommunicado.
He could also point to the undisputed fact that no one other than
the police had seen him during the sixteen days of detention and
interrogation that preceded his confessions. Moreover, on the basis
of these confessions he was sentenced to death, which however painful otherwise, does not "hurt" one who is seeking to gain close appellate court scrutiny and reversal. Nevertheless, Davis lost in the
state courts and, on habeas corpus, in the two lower federal courts. 16
True, Davis is only one case, but most alleged victims of impermissible police interrogation enter the "swearing contest" with many
fewer weapons.
The dissenters are startled at how the majority manages to leap
over high historical and linguistic barriers to bring the privilege
against self-incrimination into the interrogation room. "A trompe
l'oeil,"'17 proclaims Justice Harlan. "At odds with American and
English legal history,"' 8 reports Justice White, joined by Justices
lays down I would follow the more pliable dictates of the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which we are accustomed to administering and which we know from our cases are effective instruments in
protecting persons in police custody.
Id. at 503.
12. 384 U.S. at 505.
13. A close student of the problem so characterized them a full twenty years ago,
pointing to the almost insurmountable problems of proof confronting the alleged
victim of improper interrogation practices. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 55 YAL= L.J. 694, 708 (1946).

14. 384 U.S. at 505.
15. 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (on federal habeas corpus). Since, in another case handed
down the same day, the Court declined to give the new rules retroactive effect,
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), it applied the traditional confession rules
to strike down the Davis confessions, Justices Clark and Harlan dissenting.
16. See the discussion at notes 164-82 infra.

17. 384 U.S. at 510.
18. Id. at 531.
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Harlan and Stewart. "Decisions like these," warns Justice White,
"cannot rest alone on syllogism, metaphysics or some ill-defined
notions of natural justice."'19
Miranda may leave something to be desired, but it deserves a
better reception than this. True, it amounts to a substantial jump
2
from Escobedo,20 which, in turn, marked a jump from Haynes. 1
But Miranda is hardly a thunderbolt from the blue. It is unquestionably a sharp departure from the recent past, but if one travels
back far enough-"Oh, no!" many a reader will exclaim at this
22
point. "Not another 'we but return to old principle' discourse." I
sympathize with these readers.
Police-prosecution-minded critics of the courts can be exasperating; at least they have often exasperated me.2 But champions of
liberty and privacy can also be exasperating; at least they have even
exasperated me. Every year I teach Adamson v. California,24 and
though I never fail to pummel the majority opinion, I never fail
to gag at Justice Murphy's dissent: "Much can be said pro and con
as to the desirability of allowing comment on the failure of the accused to testify. But policy arguments are to no avail in the face
of a clear constitutional command." 25 I joined in the general rejoicing when Gideon v. Wainwright 6 was handed down, but I
winced at Justice Black's assertion that "the Court in Betts v. Brady
27
made an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents"
and at his assurance that "in returning to these old precedents
...we but restore constitutional principles ....,2s
I am well aware that for what I am about to say I, too, shall
be accused of finding refuge in constitutional language whose specificity and immutability is largely illusory, of "returning" to a
mythical past, or at least of being less impressed with historical facts
which do not fit my theories than with those which do. I adhere
19. Id. at 531-32.
20. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
21. 373 U.S. 503 (1963). But this was not nearly as long a jump as the many who
were thunderstruck by Escobedo seemed to think. See Herman, The Supreme Court
and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO STATE L.J. 449, 454-56 (1964).
22. See generally Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, in 1963
SUPREME COURT REv EW 211, 234-42 (Kurland ed.).
23. See, e.g., Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of
the Courts, 49 CO.NEL L.Q. 436 passim (1964).
24. 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
25. 332 U.S. at 125. Eighteen years later the Court did vindicate Justice Murphy's
position, although it was not content to rest on a "plain reading" of the Constitution.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (Douglas, J.).
26. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
27. Id. at 344.
28. Ibid.
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to the view that whether or not the Court's reading of the privilege
against self-incrimination in Malloy v. Hogan29 "makes good sense,
. . .it constitutes bad history-modern history, that iS."'3 0 I still
maintain that although "the old Brain case might well have furnished a steppingstone to the standard advanced in Malloy, ...
until Escobedo, at any rate, it only amounted to an early excursion
from the prevailing multifactor approach." 3' I claim only this:
(1) The linguistic and historical barriers, whatever they were,
which lay in the path of Miranda's application of the privilege to
"custodial questioning" were considerably less formidable than those
surmounted when the privilege was applied to legislative investiga32
tions and civil proceedings. Yet long before Brown v. Mississippi,
the Court's first fourteenth amendment due process confession case,
it was settled, rightly or wrongly, that the privilege did apply to
3 and
these latter proceedings. Given Counselman v. Hitchcock"
34
McCarthy v. Arndstein Miranda appears to be an a fortiori case;
29. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
30. Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 47 (Howard ed. 1965).

31. Ibid. The reference is to Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
32. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
33. 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The Court held that appellant need not answer questions
asked in a grand jury investigation which would tend to incriminate him because the
"protection of § 860 [of the Revised Statutes] is not coextensive with the constitutional provision." Id. at 565. The statute protected appellant against direct use of
his testimony in a criminal proceeding, but "could not, and would not, prevent
the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against
him .
I..."
Id. at 564. Appellee argued that:
An investigation before a grand jury is in no sense "a criminal case." The
inquiry is for the purpose of finding whether a crime has been committed and
whether any one shall be accused of an offense. The inquiry is secret; there is
no accuser, no parties, plaintiff or defendant. The whole proceeding is ex parte.
Id. at 554. The Court retorted that:
It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision can only
be, that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a
criminal prosecution against himself.... The object was to insure that a person
should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give
testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime.
The privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief
against which it seeks to guard.
Id. at 562.
In Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) and Quinn v. United States, 349
U.S. 155 (1955), the privilege against self-incrimination was successfully invoked by
petitioners who refused to answer certain questions asked of them by the Committee
on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives. Members of the Court
differed only as to whether petitioners had properly claimed the privilege for themselves; not even the dissenting justices paused to consider whether a congressional
investigation is "a criminal case."
34. 266 U.S. 34 (1924). Rejecting the government's broad contention that the
privilege "does not apply in any civil proceeding," id. at 40, as well as its narrow
contention that the privilege "does not relieve a bankrupt from the duty to give
information which is sought for the purpose of discovering his estate," id. at 41, a
unanimous Court observed, per Justice Brandeis:
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that is, unless one is prepared to rekindle the Twining-A damsonMalloy debate.
(2) The prize for ingenuity goes not to the Supreme Court for
finally applying the privilege to the police station but to those who
managed to devise rationales for excluding it from the stationhouse
all these years. Dwell for a moment on the reasoning that because
police officers have no legal authority to compel statements of any
kind, there is nothing to counteract, there is no legal obligation to
which a privilege can apply, and hence the police can elicit statements from suspects who are likely to assume or be led to believe
that there are legal (or extralegal) sanctions for contumacy.8 5 Is it
unduly harsh to say, as those who do not use strong words lightly
37
36
have, that such reasoning is "casuistic" -"a quibble"?
(3) Assuming a "first amendment privilege" which would relieve the fifth amendment of its burden in "belief probes,"38 most,
if not all, that can be said for the privilege applies in spades to
police interrogation. One would do well to start with what Professor
John McNaughton, no warm friend of the privilege, concluded
some six years ago after a painstaking analysis of the problem:
The significant purposes of the privilege remaining after the First
Amendment albatross has been cut free . .. are two: [1] The first
is to remove the right to an answer in the hard cores of instances
where compulsion might lead to inhumanity, the principal inhumanity being abusive tactics by a zealous questioner. [2] The
second is to comply with the prevailing ethic that the individual
is sovereign and that proper rules of battle between government
and individual require that the individual not be bothered for less
than good reason and not be conscripted by his opponents to defeat
himself.
Both policies of the privilege which I accept, as well as most of
those which I reject, apply with full force to insure that police
in informal interrogations not have the right to compel self-incriminatory answers. Whether the result is reached by pointing
The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding
in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and
criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal
responsibility him who gives it.
Id. at 40.
35. Hopefully, this contention was made for the last time in the Miranda oral
arguments. Unofficial Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 101 (Mr. Siegel on behalf of
respondent in Vignera v. New York), on file in University of Michigan Law Library.
36. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and
Trial, 21 RacoaD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 357, 372 (1966).
37. McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional
Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, in PoLIcE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 223, 237 (Sowle ed. 1962).

38. Id. at 241.
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out the elementary fact that police have not been given the authority to compel disclosures of any kind or whether the result is
put on the ground that the person questioned is "privileged" not
to answer makes little difference. Answers should not be compelled
by police....s9
(4) There is nothing very new or unusual about the problem
which confronted the Court in Miranda; there is nothing really
startling or inventive about the solution. I think it may fairly be
said that the police station is the third field on which the basic issue
in Miranda has been fought. The force of the privilege, or radiations from it, led (in the seventeenth century) to the abolition of
judicial interrogation at the trial itself, and (in the nineteenth
century) to the disappearance of interrogation at the preliminary
examination as well. These developments occurred at a time when
"local prosecuting officials were almost unknown" 40 and a "primitive
constabulary .
. , consisting of watchmen rather than police
officers and wanting in any detective personnel, attempted little
41
in the way of interrogation of the persons they apprehended."
42
Eventually, "but wholly without express legal authorization," interrogation became the function of the emerging organized police
and prosecuting forces. Moreover, I think it plain that the last
stand will not be made in the stationhouse. By defining "custodial
questioning" to mean "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," 48 the Miranda Court seemed to anticipate still other battlefields-the squad
car, the streets, public places, and even homes.
That over the centuries this problem has been popping up in
different settings strongly indicates that the Miranda Court did not,
89. Id. at 237-38.
40. MAYERS, SAuLL WE AMEND THE FIFTr AMENDMENT? 86 (1959).
41. Ibid. See also Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release
or Charge, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 11, 16 n.29 (1962).

In England, "it was not until 1842, thirteen years after the formation of the
Metropolitan Police, that a small body was detached for detective work, and not
until 1878 that the Criminal Investigation Department was formally created." DEvLIN,
THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND

18 (1959).

"In America the history of preliminary examination follows a course parallel to
that run by the English institution whence it was derived." Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 80 MxC. L. REv. 1224,

1285 (1932).
42. MAYERS, op. cit. supra note 40, at 87.
43. 384 U.S. at 444. The "significant" in "deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way" does not appear to be very significant, for at two other places
the Court drops this qualification of deprivation of freedom constituting custodial
questioning. Id. at 477, 478.
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and did not need to, invoke a "new" fifth amendment. This history,
however, is also consistent with the view that we cannot, never could
for very long, and never will be able to live with the "old" one.
It may be that in this area of the law we cannot do what we have
done with respect to Brown v. Board of Education" and Baker v.
Carr,45 namely take our ideals down from the walls where we have
kept them framed "to be pointed at with pride on ceremonial occasions, '"4 and "put flesh and blood" on them and "look them in
the teeth." 47 But this goes to Miranda's hope of posterity, not to
its pride of ancestry.
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
45. 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
46. Schaefer, Comments [on Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney Behind?,
54 Ky. L.J. 464 (1966)], 54 Ky. L.J. 521, 524 (1966). This symposium was held six
months before Miranda was handed down.
47. Ibid.
Justice Schaefer also said, it should be noted, that "if the ideals are too
broadly stated to meet essential practical objectives then I would suggest that the
ideals must be modified and that we ought to be frank." Id. at 524. He indicated,
further, that this might well be the case with respect to police interrogation:
When it is suggested that the right to counsel be projected into the station house,
there is an immediate response. Many voices answered--some stridently, but I
think none more eloquently than [fellow-panelist] Mr. Kuh answered this morning-saying that it is not possible to enforce criminal law unless station house
interrogation in the absence of counsel is permitted. I think I share that view,
but I don't know. . .. There just isn't anything very worthwhile to indicate
what has happened and what would happen if station house interrogation were
not permitted save in the presence of counsel. It scares me, but I don't know.
Id. at 523.
Miranda, however, does not "fully project" counsel into the stationhouse-at least
not to the degree desired by some ACLU spokesmen. On learning of the Miranda
decision, the executive director of the national group, John de J. Pemberton, Jr.,
tempered his enthusiasm by voicing "regret that the Court did not take the final
step of stating that the privilege cannot be fully assured unless a suspect's lawyer is
present during police station interrogation." N.Y. Times, June 14, 1966, p. 25, col. 1.
Similarly, the director of the New York chapter (Aryeh Neier) commented: "[Miranda]
doesn't go far enough in protecting those who most need protection. We do believe
that a person must have the advice of counsel in order to intelligently waive the
assistance of counsel." Ibid.
To say that Miranda does permit some stationhouse questioning in the absence
of counsel-if a duly advised suspect intelligently waives his right to the assistance
of counsel-is not to quibble. Not if, as Los Angeles District Attorney Evelle Younger
concluded (after surveying more than 1,000 post-Miranda cases, in fully half of
which the defendant had made an incriminating statement): "Large or small, ...
conscience usually, or at least often, drives a guilty person to confess. If an individual wants to confess, a warning from a police officer, acting as required by
recent decisions, is not likely to discourage him." OFFICE OF THE DSRIr ATORNEY,
COUNTY OF Los ANGELES, RESULTS OF SURVEY CONDUCTED IN THE DISnuCT ATroaRNEY's
OFFICE OF Los ANGELES COUNTY REGARDING THE EFFECTS OF THE DORADO AND MIRANDA
DECISIONS UPON THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY CASES 4 (Aug. 4, 1966) (copy on file

in the University of Michigan Law Library). See also Brief for United States, p. 30
n.20, Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): "[T]he great majority of clear
admissions or confessions are prompted either by conscience, by a desire to get the
matter over with, or by a calculated design to secure more favorable treatment."
But see Address by Richard H. Kuh of the New York Bar, Eighteenth Annual
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OR... LANGUAGE"

The Miranda majority's application of the privilege against selfincrimination to police interrogation, insists dissenting Justice
White, "has no significant support in the history of the privilege
Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices, Aug. 5, 1966, pp. 1, 4 (copy on file in
the University of Michigan Law Library):
If we are to be logical and intellectually honest, we must recognize there is rarely
such a thing as Miranda contemplates-an intelligent, voluntary waiver of the
Fifth Amendment privileges.... Had the United States Supreme Court recognized what I think is dear-at least the improbability, if not the impossibility,
of an intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege-the judges might
have squarely wrestled with the issue and said: Confessions are no longer usable
in our adversary system."

To the same effect is Nedrud, The New Fifth Amendment Concept: Self-Incrimination

Redefined, 2 NAT'L Dxsr. ATr'Ys Ass'N J. 112, 113 (1966), maintaining that "certainly, under the requirements of the [Miranda] Court, no one in his 'right mind' would waive
such rights."
Whether suspects are continuing to confess because they don't understand the
whole "formula" or because the police are "stretching the truth" when they claim they
give the full warning, or because the promptings of conscience and the desire to get it
over with are indeed overriding the impact of the warning, the fact remains that
they are continuing to confess with great frequency-which would not have been
the case if the Court had adopted the position taken by the aforementioned ACLU
spokesman. Even Brooklyn District Attorney Aaron Koota, who has charged that the
new rulings have "shackled" law enforcement, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1966, p. 1, col. 2,
claims that only 40% of major felony suspects have refused to make statements after
being warned of their rights. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 17, col. 1. Mr. Koota
reported a sharp increase of refusals to talk after Miranda, but the commanding
officer of one Manhattan detective squad reported that "by and large, they [suspects]
readily admit what they've been doing even after they've been told of their rights."
N.Y. Times, June 25, 1966, p. 1, col. S.And Mr. Younger disclosed that "the percentage of cases in which confessions or admissions were made has not decreased,
as might have been anticipated, because of the increased scope of the admonitions
required by Miranda." Los ANGELES SURvEY, op. cit. supra, at 3.
The Miranda Court required enough things "at one gulp," for me at any rate,
cf. 384 U.S. at 502 (Clark, J., dissenting), but a rule that a suspect needs counsel to
waive counsel is by no means unthinkable. The "waiver" standards are designed for
judicial proceedings; no judge presides in the stationhouse. In oral argument,
Justice Stewart raised the possibility that a suspect could not waive his constitutional
rights without the advice of counsel and petitioner agreed "that this is the worst
place for waiver" because "the party alleging waiver has control of the party alleged
to have waived." Unofficial Transcript of Oral Argument in Miranda and Companion
Cases, p. 84 (oral argument of Mr. Earle for petitioner in Vignera v. New York),
on file in University of Michigan Law Library. See also id. at 73. However, the
Miranda opinion does not explicitly consider this possibility. The ACLU amicus

brief, on the other hand, does not explicitly consider any other possibility. Rather,
as I read it at any rate, the ACLU contends that effectuation of the privilege requires
the "Presence of counsel" (emphasis added), a phrase it employs a dozen times,
Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, pp, 3, 4, 9, 22-25, 27-28, 33, not merely advice
as to the immediate availability of counsel, a reading which finds support in the
post-Miranda comments of the ACLU spokesmen, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1966, p. 25,
col. 1. The failure of the Court to deal explicitly with (if only to reject) the ACLU
contention is surprising, for in all other respects the ACLU amicus brief presents
"a conceptual, legal and structural formulation that is practically identical to the
majority opinion--even as to use of language in various passages of the opinion."
Dash, Foreword to MEDALE, FROM ESCOBEDo To MIRANDA:
PREME COURT DEcISION xvii (196).
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or in the language of the Fifth Amendment. '48 The first authority
he cites is the late Professor Edmund M. Morgan, who said that
"there is nothing in the reports to suggest that [the rule excluding
coerced confessions] . . . has its roots in the privilege against selfincrimination. And so far as the cases reveal, the privilege, as such,
seems to have been given effect only in judicial proceedings, including the preliminary examinations by authorized magistrates." 49
For Justice White to lead with Morgan is a bit puzzling, since
further along in this same article Professor Morgan points out:
The function which the police have assumed in interrogating
an accused is exactly that of the early committing magistrates, and
the opportunities for imposition and abuse are fraught with much
greater danger.... Investigation by the police is not judicial, but
when it consists of an examination of an accused, it is quite as much
an official proceeding as the early English preliminary hearing before a magistrate, and it has none of the safeguards of a judicial
proceeding. If the historical confines of the privilege are to be
broadened, this surely is an area that needs inclusion for reasons
infinitely more compelling than those applicable to the arraignment.
Mr. Wigmore himself declares that the protection of the privilege "extends to all manner of proceedings in which testimony is
to be taken, whether litigious or not, and whether 'ex parte' or
otherwise. It therefore applies in... investigations by a legislature
or a body having legislative functions, and in investigations by
administrative officials." If so, how can testimony taken by the
police be excluded?5 0
Continues Justice White:
Our own constitutional provision provides that no person "shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
These words, when "[c]onsidered in the light to be shed by grammar and the dictionary appear to signify simply that nobody shall
be compelled to give oral testimony against himself in a criminal
proceeding under way in which he is a defendent." Corwin, The
Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause,
29 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 2. And there is very little in the surrounding
circumstances of the adoption of the Fifth Amendment or in the
then existing state constitutions or in state practice which would
give the constitutional provision any broader meaning. Mayers,
48. 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966).
49. Ibid., quoting Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L.
Ray. 1, 18 (1949).
50. Morgan, supra note 49, at 27-28, 29. (Emphasis in the original.)
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The Federal Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Constitutional or Common-Law?, 4 American Journal of Legal History

107 (1960). 51

However, the Corwin article relied upon by Justice White does
call attention to a circumstance surrounding the adoption of the
fifth amendment which suggests that the constitutional provision
is entitled to a broader meaning:
The result [in late seventeenth century England of the extension
from civil to criminal cases of the rule that a party is not a competent witness on account of interest] was that henceforth the mouth
of an accused ... was dosed whether for or against himself; and

it is in this form that the immunity of accused persons passed to
the American colonies balanced, that is, by the corresponding disability. Not until 1878, following a similar reform in several of the
states, was the right to testify in their own behalf, under oath, accorded defendants in the national courts.
[S]ince the [federal and early state] constitutional provisions ...
did not overrule the common law in excluding an accused from the
witness stand, their stipulation for his immunity taken by itself becomes pointless. If only, therefore, to save the framers of these provisions from having loaded them with a meaningless tautology, their
language had to be given other than its literal significance ....52
What does this immunity of the accused at that time signify?
"Therefore," Dean Griswold argues, "the importance of the privilege against self-incrimination [at that time] . . .was in investiga-

tions, in inquiries, and with respect to questioning of the defendant
by the judge in criminal cases, such as had been made notorious by
Judge Jeffries."'5 3 According to Professor Mayers, however, the implications from the accused's incompetence to testify need not and
should not carry us so far. He maintains that the privilege is not
available to a mere witness, but only to an "accused," and that the
privilege is given sufficient content and meaning if it is viewed as
protecting an accused not sworn as a witness from interrogation by
prosecutor or judge at the trial (a practice which continued in England into the eighteenth century and in New York, at least, as late
as the Revolution), or as protecting an accused from questioning
before trial.5 4 In the same article invoked by Justice White, Professor Mayers makes these points:
51. 384 U.S. at 526-27.
52. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause,
1, 11-12.
29 MicH. L. -REv.
53. Griswold, The Individual and the Fifth Amendment, The New Leader, Oct.

29, 1956, pp. 20, 22.
54. 4 Am. J. LwAL Hisr. 114 n.20 (1960).
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The possibility that Madison and Ellsworth (the latter the chairman of the Senate committee responsible for these changes in arrangement) may have had chiefly in mind the protection of the
accused (and of the suspect not yet charged) from pre-trial questioning, rather than from questioning at the trial, is enhanced by
the fact that the acccused was not at that time (or for nearly a century thereafter) a competent witness at his trial ....

[I]f one con-

cedes, arguendo, that the protection of the accused on trial was not
the object, it does not follow, as seems to be assumed, that the
purpose of the provision must have been to protect the witness. It
could just as well have been intended to protect the accused or the
suspect before trial. It is perhaps relevant that Madison's own state
had had experience with oppressive questioning of suspects by the
royal governor just before the Revolution. 55
In 1833 appeared Story's monumental treatise [apparently the
first treatise on the Constitution which discusses the privilege]....
His discussion of the self-incrimination clause' of the Fifth Amendment discloses a complete unawareness of its application to the
witness, and seems indeed to confine the intention of the provision
to the accused in the pretrial stage-to stress the protection against
executive oppression of the accused. 56
Professor Mayers, one may fairly conclude, is bent on overruling
Counselman v. Hitchcock, not on precluding Miranda v. Arizona.
Professor Mayers, I think it fair to say, regards the application of
the privilege to legislative investigations as a much sharper departure from the understanding of the draftsmen who framed the
self-incrimination provision, the Congress which proposed it and
the state legislatures which ratified it, than the application of the
privilege to police interrogation.
If for no other reason than that there were no professional police
either in England or America when the privilege was drafted and
ratified, or at least the police had not yet assumed the functions of
criminal investigation, the extent to which Miranda marks a departure from the "original understanding" will probably never be
55. Ibid. (Emphasis in the original.)
56. Id. at 121. (Emphasis in the original.)
Professor Mayers is referring to 3 STORY,

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF

UNITED STATES § 1782 (1833):
[The privilege against self-incrimination] also is but an affirmance of a common
law privilege. But it is of inestimable value. It is well known, that in some
countries, not only are criminals compelled to give evidence against themselves,
but are subjected to the rack or torture in order to procure a confession of
guilt. And what is worse, it has been (as if in mockery or scorn) attempted to
excuse, or justify it, upon the score of mercy and humanity to the accused. It

Ta

has been contrived, (it is pretended,) that innocence should manifest itself by a
stout resistance, or guilt by a plain confession; as if a man's innocence were
to be tried by the hardness of his constitution, and his guilt by the sensibility
of his nerves.
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fully settled. This is not to say, however, that a sketch of the history of pre-police interrogation is unilluminating.
To begin at what should be a sufficient starting point for our
purposes, justices of the peace in England were empowered by the
middle of the fourteenth century "to take and arrest all those that
they may find by indictment, or by suspicion and to put them in
5 7 Two centuries later, the emergent practice of making
prison."1
some kind of examination of suspects before committing them for
formal accusation was legalized by the Statutes of Philip and Mary
(1554-55). 51 The "object" of these statutes was "to expose and detect
a man assumed to be guilty"; 59 pursuant to them "a justice of the
peace really acted as police, constable, detective, prosecuting attorney, examining magistrate and complaining witness."'00 By the
beginning of the eighteenth century, writes Professor Kauper, "the
spirit" of the now fully established rule against self-incrimination
"must have been carried over to the preliminary examination, for
in this examination there was evident a gradual abandonment of
judicial interrogation of the accused. The practice developed of
taking only a voluntary statement by the accused after cautioning
his as to his rights ...

[The] practice was developing of permitting

the accused to have counsel at this examination." 61 The Statutes
of Philip and Mary were formally repealed in 1848,62 but "long
before" that, the "inquisitional preliminary examination . . . had

sunk into oblivion and a purely judicial inquiry had supplanted
it."63

In America, the history of preliminary examination ran a parallel course. Colonial magistrates "rigorously examined persons
suspected of crime . . . after the manner of the English justice of

the peace."16 4 In 1641, "when the [Massachusetts] colony was troubled by a wave of vicious criminality [when wasn't there a 'crime
crisis'?], Governor Bellingham consulted the elders of the New
England churches on the question 'how far a magistrate might exact
57. The Justices of the Peace Act, 1360, 34 Edw. 3, c. 1.
58. 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13, § 4 (1554); 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10, § 2 (1555); see
MOLEY, OUR CRIMINAL COURTS 15 (1930).
59. 1 STPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 221

(1883).
60. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree,
30 MicH. L. RiEv. 1224, 1233 (1932). See generally 5 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGisa LAW 191-92 (1924); Grant, Our Common Law Constitution, 40 B.U.L. REv. 1,
10-12 (1960); 1 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 59, at 221-25.
61. Kauper, supra note 60, at 1233-34.

62. 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, § 18 (1848).
63. Kauper, supra note 60, at 1234.
64. HAsKINS, LAW A AUTHrrOn'" IN

EARLY MASSACHUSEmrS

174 (1960).
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a confession from a delinquent in capital cases?' "65 In their study
of colonial New York, Goebel and Naughton, citing examples largely
from the early and middle eighteenth century, reported "numerous
cases where the minutes reveal the reading at the trial of a prisoner's confession. It had to be proved by the magistrate who took it,
but otherwise no further formalities were observed."0 66 They point
out that "although a confession could only be introduced if not
made under oath, it would serve to convict without corroborating
evidence, if the defendant had pleaded not guilty in open court."6 7
Since the felony defendant conducted his own defense and was thus
directly vulnerable to questioning from the bench . . . the most
dangerous juncture at a trial for the defendant-counsel was the
moment when the Crown introduced a confession taken by a justice
at a preliminary hearing. . . . Obviously if a defendant had any
remarks to make about his earlier words, he would likely find himself answering questions from the bench [and] . . .where he had
made more than one preliminary statement and had contradicted
himself, the introduction of all the "confessions" would tempt him
6
to unguarded speech, or he might be asked to explain.
Although the transference of criminal investigation functions
from magistrates to police did not occur as sharply in this country
as it did in England, 69 and there were forces other than the use of
the privilege which were inimical to a magistrate's exercise of police
functions in America,7 0 it may be said that "the establishment of
the rule against self-incrimination, with its significant reaction in
England resulting in abolition of the practice of interrogating the
accused, had the same effect in the American colonies. Formal constitutional recognition of the rule contributed to the tradition already accumulating against exercise of inquisitorial powers by the
magistrate or justice of the peace." 71 It may also be said that "if
65. Id. at 201.
66. GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 654 (1944).
67. Id. at 653.
68. Id. at 653-54.
69. See Barrett, Police Practicesand the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge,
50 CAuF. L. R.y. 11, 17 n.39 (1962).
70. Professor Pound points to "the idea of separation of powers, so much insisted
on in the American polity," which "judicialized" the preliminary examination "before
the institution of a modem police had developed, and so left a gap which in
practice had to be filled outside of law." POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 88
(1929). Professor Moley, however, suggests that in many American communities there
may not have been much of "a gap," commenting that "the early development of the
county prosecutor as an aggressive agent of law enforcement, and the power and
prestige of the sheriff in all frontier communities, probably prevented the justice of
the peace and the city magistrates from assuming much importance as investigators
of crimes and suspected criminals." Moray, op. cit. supra note 58, at 20.
71. Kauper, supra note 60, at 1236.
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the police are permitted to interrogate an accused under the presthey are
sure of compulsory detention to secure a confession ..
doing the very same acts which historically the judiciary was doing
in the seventeenth century but which the privilege against self-incrimination abolished." 72 In this connection it is quite instructive,
I believe, to turn to mid-nineteenth century criticism of judicial
"examination" in New York, where that practice survived, relatively late, until that time. Indeed, the analysis of the alleged evils
in and suggested remedies for the "examination" as spelled out by
the Commissioners on Practice and Pleading7 3 in the course of
submitting their proposed Code of Criminal Procedure to the New
York Legislature in the year 1849 so strikingly parallels the Miranda
discussion-if we but substitute "interrogation" for "examination"
and "police" for "magistrate"-that I cannot resist the temptation
to quote from that remarkable report at length:7 4
. . . [I]n the early stages of the accusation,--when he is hurried
before a magistrate upon a charge of which he may be innocent,
and of which, even if it be otherwise, the law has not yet adjudged
him guilty,--the first dictate of duty seems to be, to inform [the accused) . . . of his rights and to afford him every opportunity to

throw around himself the protection of the law. And yet, according
to the existing system of practice, upon the idle fiction that every
man is presumed to know the law, he is supposed to be informed
of the first right secured to him by the Constitution,--that of appearing and defending himself by counsel. If he happens to be
ignorant of this, the examination of the case proceeds, and testimony is taken against him which may be illegal in its character, or
which, without the substantial opportunity for a cross examination,
may in some contingencies be used against him on his trial.
Against this prejudice the Commissioners propose to guard, by
requiring the magistrate to inform the defendant of his right to
the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings, and before any
further proceedings are had,--to allow the defendant a reasonable
time to procure counsel,--and to send for such counsel in the city
or town, as the defendant may name. (Sec. 180, 181.)
In this proceeding [the "examination" by the magistrate], the
Commissioners have discovered principles which they deem at war
with the rights of the accused. The very term "examination," which
72. BESEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: ROLE or
THE SuPREmE COURT 104 (1955).
73. The commissioners were David Dudley Field, David Graham and Arphaxed
Loomis.

74.

COMMISSIONERS ON PRACICE AND PLEADINGS,

REP'T No. 4-CODE OF CRIMINAL

PRocaURE xxv, xxvii-xxix (1849).
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is used in the statute, and the proceedings pointed out as the mode
of taking it, all seem to be a departure from the spirit of the constitutional declaration, which provides that "no person shall be
compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself."
The object of the examination, as it was originally instituted, was,
not to place the defendant in the hands of a cross-examining magistrate, who might, according to the principles of the French practice,
by the exercise of ingenuity, extract from the defendant evidence
of his guilt. But it was designed, in the humane and benign spirit
of the common law, to give the defendant an opportunity, by a
voluntary explanation, to exculpate himself from the charge....
Instead of his being informed, as the fact is, that [the "examination"] is furnished to him as a shield and is not to be used against
him as a sword, he is by a loose course of practice, if no other
motive be imputable, led to believe that it is one of the ordinary
proceedings against him, having in view the establishment of his
guilt. He is accordingly examined by a series of searching questions,
oftentimes proceeding upon the assumption of his guilt, and is
driven to the alternative of equivocating as to the facts, or of denying circumstances plainly true, or of what is occasionally his resort, declining to answer. Those who are in the slightest degree
conversant with criminal trials, can well attest how successfully the
adoption of either of these alternatives, can be used against the
defendant on his trial....
The Commissioners have proposed to dispense entirely with this
examination, and to substitute in its place, what the law designed
should alone be furnished, an opportunity to the defendant to
make a statement in his exculpation. They accordingly provide,
that when the examination of the witnesses on the part of the
people is closed, the magistrate shall inform the defendant that it
is his right to make a statement in relation to the charge against
him; that the statement is designed to enable him, if he sees fit, to
answer the charge, and to explain the facts alleged against him:that he is at liberty to waive it,-and that his waiver cannot be
used against him on the trial. (Sec. 188.) If he elect to make the
statement, it is then to be taken by the magistrate, who, instead of
being left at liberty to put every form of question which his ingenuity may suggest, is restricted to asking the defendant general
questions as to his age and residence and the like, and to asking
him to give any explanation he may think proper, of the circumstances appearing against him, and to state any facts which he
thinks will tend to his exculpation. (Sec. 190.) ...
On the other side of the Atlantic, but a year earlier-1848, the
very year the Statutes of Philip and Mary were formally repealeda Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the state of the
criminal law in the Channel Islands found "objectionable" "the
preliminary examinations 'au secret,' and the consequent interroga-
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toire of the accused, ' 75 despite the fact that "the present practice
...requires that [the prisoner] be told that he cannot be compelled

to answer the questions of the Court, and that what he says will
be used against him at the trial." 76 Again, the Commissioners' com-

ments on the relationship between the "right of silence" and the
right to counsel have obvious application to the Miranda controversy:

77

[The prisoner] is not allowed the assistance of Counsel, who would
probably advise him not to answer. Such a privilege would amount
to the abolition of the interrogatoire. In truth, a voluntary interrogatoire is a contradiction; and the compulsion of the process,
once physical but still moral, is not the least objectionable part of
the system. The caution to abstain from answering, if the party
thinks fit, is always given in words; but a prisoner, acting without
counsel, will almost always, in practice, feel himself bound to answer. Then the questions put are those which arise from evidence
which has been so arranged (and quite properly) as to give the
fullest effect to the prima facie case of accusation. The answers
given to such questions are given at a great disadvantage; and,
probably, this disadvantage is even exaggerated by the prisoner,
who is pressed with the circumstances of suspicion marshalled in
their most formidable order. Hence arises a temptation to evade
and deceive, by which an ignorant person would be seduced, however innocent of the offence charged. Another very dangerous feature in this practice appears to be that its tendency is to engage
the Court, which conducts the examination, in a contest with the
prisoner ....
"It is impossible to deny the efficacy of the present practice as
an instrument for the occasional detection of crime," conceded the
Commissioners, "but it is equally clear that the practice is liable
to mislead, even when administered with the purest intentions."78
"We have no doubt," they hastened to add, "that the members of
the Royal Court were perfectly sincere in assuring us that it is
often of the greatest use to a prisoner, and that they never knew
an innocent man condemned in consequence of it. But it appears
to us dangerous to make legal guilt depend upon anything short of
proof from extrinsic evidence or the voluntary confession of the
79
accused."
75. COMMaISSIONERS ON CRIMINAL LAW IN THE CHANNEL ISLANDS, REP'T No. 2 (1848),
reprinted in 8 Rep. St. Tr. 1210 (N. S. 1850-58) (App. C).
76. Id. at 1200. This marked "a departure from the old law in Terrien and the
Approbation, by which the accused in refusing to answer or not answering pertinently,
would be subjected to the torture." Ibid.
77. Id. at 1211-12.
78. Id. at 1212.
79. Ibid.
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II. "TRAINED INCAPACITY" AND THOSE WHO LACKED IT
Why did the fictions exposed in the 1840's have to be exposed
anew in the 1960's? Why did the old abuses in new forms so persist
and flourish?
For one thing, as I indicated at the outset, the "legal mind"
(unhappily) was equal to the task of seeming to reconcile the grim
facts with lofty principles: police interrogation-indeed, the "third
degree"-did not violate the privilege because the questioning did
not involve any kind of judicial process for the taking of testimony.8 0 This "trained incapacity" (to use Veblen's phrase) to see
the problem in the round was long utilized by those who possessed
it not only to shut from their minds the de facto inquisitorial system, but also to thwart attempts to mitigate such a system by "formalizing" or "judicializing" it. For example, when, in the early
1940's, a member of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure advocated as a cure for the abuses of secret
police interrogation a system whereby a judicial officer would question a suspect only after informing the suspect "of his right to the
advice of counsel, that he is under no obligation to answer any
question, that any answer he chooses to give may possibly be used
against him, and that his refusal to answer cannot be used against
him,""' the recommendation was rejected "as being contrary to the
basic traditions of Anglo-American criminalprocedure, and as probably violative of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination."8 2 Why basic traditions were honored and self-incrimination
problems avoided in the absence of these important safeguards was
not made clear. Perhaps this is what Mr. Dooley meant when he
told us that he "knowed a society wanst to vote a monyment to a
man an' refuse to help his fam'ly, all in wan night."
Some men are brash enough to write books about the law without adequate "legal conditioning." One such man was Ernest J.
Hopkins, an official investigator employed by the Wickersham Commission. According to Zechariah Chafee, Hopkins showed "notable
skill and enterprise in breaking through the barriers of silence
80. Even those who pointed out that "the private or secret interrogation of arrested
persons ... has become ... in many cases the foundation of scandal, harsh criticism
and judicial condemnation" conceded that the privilege against self-incrimination
"is obviously limited to judicial statements." ALI CODE or CRIMINAL PROcEDURE § 38,
comment at 182 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1928).
81. Fan. R. CPuM. P. 249 (Prelim. Draft 1943) (Professor Waite's proposed Additional
Rule 6.1).
82. FmD. R. Cium. P. 253 (Prelim. Draft 1943) (reply memorandum prepared by
Secretary of Advisory Committee). (Emphasis added.)

HeinOnline -- 65 Mich. L. Rev. 77 1966-1967

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:59

which surround official lawlessness."8 3 However, being a newspaperman by profession rather than a lawyer, Mr. Hopkins showed a
notable lack of skill and enterprise in grasping why the privilege
against self-incrimination meant so much in the courtroom but so
little in the police station. Thus, five years before Brown v. Mississippi and thirty-five years before Miranda v. Arizona, this "untrained observer" said of the prevailing definitions of the "third
degree" (e.g., "rigid and severe examination," "oppressive methods,"
84
infliction of "suffering"):
[These definitions convey no hint as to the legality or illegality of
the basic process or the methods used therein. There is a fundamental right possessed by the American citizen ... set forth in the
Fifth Amendment in the following words:
Nor shall any person . . . be compelled in a criminal case to
be a witness against himself.
This strikes directly at the heart of the situation; I do not see why
one should seek farther than the Constitution for a clear definition
of the third degree. The gross unlawfulness of the practice is thus
stated by implication:
The third degree is the compelling of a person in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself.
The use of the more objective concept of compulsion, borrowed
from the Constitution . . . gets us down to the central question,
the legitimacy of the pre-trial inquisition itself.
There are a thousand forms of compulsion; our police show
great ingenuity in the variety employed. But any and all forms of
compulsion, with the object of securing confessions, must violate
the constitutional guarantee . . . Our police, from the moment a
man falls into their hands in an important case, hound him with
the persistent demand "Confess." They may use violence and torture or they may not; but in either case the secret police-held grilling or sweating violates the time-honored and peculiarly important
restraint by which Americans, and the English before them, have
sought to protect themselves against official tyranny.
For those troubled by the spectacle of a man so unfamiliar with
prevailing legal reasoning writing a book about the law, it should
be pointed out by way of mitigating circumstances that even eminent lawyers have (happily) demonstrated a surprising lack of
"trained incapacity" to see the fairly obvious in this area. Take
Zechariah Chafee, for example. Chafee knew better. In the early
1930's he had recognized, albeit not been impressed by, the legal
88. HopmNs, Out LAw.Es PoucE vii (1931) (Preface).
84. Id. at 193-95. (Emphasis in the original.)
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reasoning which led to the checking of the privilege at the door of
the interrogation room.8 5 However, he forgot this a generation
later. Indeed, this oversight permeated his defense of the privilege
in the 1950's:
There are at least three reasons for the privilege against self-incrimination. In the first place, although it plainly interferes with
short-time efficiency by making it harder to discover facts through
questioning, the privilege is likely to promote long-time efficiency.
If prosecutors and police could count on grilling a suspect as
much as they pleased, they might not take the trouble to build up
a solid case from objective proofs....

The second reason for stoutly maintaining the right of every
man not to be "compelled .. . to be a witness against himself" is

that it protects us from something far worse than answering questions. Nothing else in the Constitution prevents government officials
and policemen from extorting confessions.... 80
Similarly, Dean Erwin Griswold, who wrote a famous little book
on the subject, displayed what some might regard as a woeful lack
of the requisite special "training":
We may better understand the importance of the Fifth Amendment by considering what not having it would mean .... If we are
not willing to let the Amendment be invoked, where, over time,
are we going to stop when police, prosecutors, or chairmen want

to get people to talk?87

Somewhat surprisingly, in a book billed as "challenging much
of the legal folklore which abounds in the discussion of the subject
85. Since the privilege exists during the trial in open court of a person who
has been formally charged with crime, it seems even more applicable to the
preliminary inquisition of a suspect by police or prosecutors before any judicial proceeding or formal charge. It is true that there is some difference of
opinion whether the third degree violates the privilege against self-incrimination;
a few courts say that it does not because the questioning does not involve any
kind of judicial process for the taking of testimony. This seems a narrow limitation of a constitutional right.

Chafee, Pollak & Stem, The Third Degree, in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 26-27 (1931).
86. CHA'EE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 186, 188 (1956). (Emphasis added.) Chafee

maintained that "the partial incorporation of [the self-incrimination] clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment has made it possible for the Supreme Court to reverse
several state convictions based on coerced confessions . . . ." Id. at 189. The Court,
per Brennan, J., did so look back on the "coerced confession" cases in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Justice Black, joined by the Chief Justice, dissenting
in Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 131 (1961). But it is not easy to see how, under
any concept of "hard-core" self-incrimination implicit in due process, the Court could
have sustained some of the state confessions it did. See Kamisar, Equal Justice in
the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JusTICE

IN OuR TIME 47-49 (Howard ed. 1965).

87. GmRSwoLD, Tm Finm AMENDMENT TODAY 75 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
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by E. N. Griswold,"'88 Professor Sidney Hook challenged Griswold
(and Chafee) only obliquely on this point. Evidently Professor
Hook's abundant "common sense" and wide reading in the law
failed to compensate for his lack of "formal legal training." Hook
took a dim view of the privilege generally. But he, too, seemed to
take for granted its applicability to police interrogation (although,
quite understandably, he belittled the protection it had in fact
provided up to that time for the person subjected to police questioning):
The use of third degree methods against suspects has always
been widespread despite the recognition of the privilege against
self-incrimination ....This may be granted and the assertion made
that the situation would be much worse if the privilege were not
recognized. There seems good reason to doubt this .... Whatever

Constitutional protection the privilege against self-incrimination
gives in safeguarding [a person] from lawless police officers is given
just as effectively by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Further, even if it were retained to reinforce
bulwarks against illegal practices of arresting authorities, its meaning could be so modified as to permit the invocation of the privilege to be cited explicitly by counsel in pleading before bench or
jury as relevant evidence in the case.
Dean Griswold insinuates several times that the Fifth Amendment is the most important, if not the only, bar to torture, and
that its retention prevents the introduction of police state methods
of medieval techniques brought up to date . .

.

. [I]n general, as

we have seen in commenting on Professor Chafee, all that would be
required, even in the complete absence of the Fifth Amendment,
would be the right to be questioned only in the presence of counsel, to cut the ground from under the objection.89
There goes Professor Hook, showing his lack of "formal legal
training" again. "Common sense" would suggest, as Chafee put it,
that "a person accused of crime needs a lawyer right after his arrest
probably more than at any other time." 90 At the time Hook made
these remarks, however, the right to the assistance of counsel was
deemed inapplicable to police interrogation because the "criminal
prosecution" had not yet begun.
In a sense, conditioning police questioning on the presence of
counsel-that, of course, is "all" that Miranda requires-does dis88. See inside cover of paperback edition (Henry Regnery Co., 1963).
89. HOOK, COMMON SENSE AND THE FIrH AMENDMENT 45-46, 58 (1957). (Emphasis
added.)
90. CHAFEE, DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN Itirms 541 (1952), quoted with
approval in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 446 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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pense with the need for the privilege against self-incrimination at
this stage-in the same way that conditioning police "encouragement" on the presence of counsel would dispense with the need for
the entrapment defense. But why should the presence of counsel
be required and why should we "effectively preclude police questioning-fair as well as unfair-until the accused [is] afforded opportunity to call his attorney" 9 1-in the complete absence of the fifth
amendment?
As is evidenced by the easy assumptions made years ago by those
who (fortunately) never acquired the "trained incapacity" to see
the problem, the application of the privilege to police interrogation can be defended as either a logical deduction from the constitutional provision or a practical condition upon its successful operation. Moreover, this approach finds much historical support in the
Anglo-American experience with prototypes of modem police interrogation (much more support than can be produced to warrant the
application of the privilege to legislative investigations and civil
proceedings).9 2 Assuming, arguendo, that in order to give the privilege a reading "as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard,"9' 3 the Court did violence to language and history, the assault
occurred, in aggravated form, long ago:
Is it not clear that a legislative investigation is not a "criminal
case"? What application, then, does the constitutional provision
have in such proceedings--or in civil trials, or elsewhere, where
persons may be subjected to questioning? This is a question which
was raised and answered long ago, so long ago in fact that lawyers
tend to take it for granted. But early courts saw that the protection
of the amendment itself would be an empty gesture if it was literally applied. For example, if the witness is required to answer
self-incriminating questions in a civil trial, or in a legislative investigation, the prosecuting officer can use his answers to provide
evidence on which he can be prosecuted or convicted. Even if the
prosecuting officer cannot use his testimony itself, he can, from that
testimony, learn other facts which he could use in the prosecution ....
For this reason, courts long ago concluded that if the privilege
is to be effective at all it must be given a comprehensive application, and thus must prevent compulsory self-incrimination in any
proceeding. This is, indeed, a broad construction of the constitu91. See note 104 infra and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Mayers, The Federal Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:
Constitutional or Common-Law, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 107 (1960); Pittman, The Fifth
Amendment: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 42 A.B.A.J. 509 (1956); Williams,
Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 FORDHAM L. REv. 19 (1955).
93. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892), quoted with approval in

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966).
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tional language, but it is a construction which has seemed to be

required if the basic objective of that language is to be realized.9 4
III. "NECEssITY" AND OTHER FORCES
What would we say of the argument that the fourth amendment
does not apply to arrests and searches made without warrants altogether, but only prohibits the use of evidence seized pursuant to
95 Does it make any more sense to argue that the
defective warrants?
fifth amendment does not apply to questioning by agents of the
state who lack any kind of judicial process for the taking of testimony, but only governs proceedings involving such process? Moreover, it so happened that the Supreme Court frequently advanced
the privilege against self-incrimination as the constitutional basis
for the federal exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases during
most of the period the privilege was deemed inapplicable to police
94. GsusworD, op. cit. supra note 87, at 54-55.
95. The government came close to making this argument in United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932), when it contended that general, exploratory searches
could be made incident to a lawful arrest, although such power could not be conferred by a search warrant. Brief for the United States, pp. 13, 15, 37 n.6. (Emphasis
added):
[T]he principles crystallized in the Fourth Amendment were not intended to
limit the right of search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest. . . . Nor, we
submit, was the search conducted by the officers in the present case a "general
exploratory search" of the kind which the framers of the Constitution intended
to prohibit by the Fourth Amendment. The abuse there aimed at was the practice of issuing general warrants without probable cause. The generality prohibited was not primarily the generality of the search actually conducted but
the generality of the authority to search without any reasonable basis for belief
that crime had been committed. . . . The Amendment does not consist of two
sentences with a break after the word "violated." It is all one sentence, and
the provision that no warrants shall issue except upon probable cause illustrates
what is meant by the provision that the right of the people to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. "The term 'unreasonable'
in the constitutions of the States [identical with the Fourth Amendment] has
allusion to what had been practiced before our revolution, and especially, to
general search warrants, on which the person, place, or thing was not described."
The government's views did not prevail in Lefkowitz, but there have been occasions
when the Court has ruled, in effect, that a search without warrant confers greater
authority than a search under warrant. See generally LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
AND THE SUPREME CouRT ch. iv (1966).
The government's argument in Lefkowitz was topped by the opinion of the court
in Hall v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727 (1924), which stated that evidence obtained
by an officer acting either without a warrant or under a void warrant was admissible
in a criminal prosecution because "we believe the framers of the Constitution of
the United States, and of this and other States, merely sought to provide against
any attempt, by legislation or otherwise, to authorize, justify or declare lawful any
unreasonable search or seizure" and "if an official, or a mere petty agent of the State,
exceeds or abuses the authority with which he is clothed, he is to be deemed as
acting, not for the State, but for himself only; and therefore he alone, and not the
State, should be held accountable for his acts." Id. at 740. (Emphasis in the original.)
The grounds advanced in Hall for admitting illegally seized evidence were familiar
ones at that time. See CoRNEsUS, SEARcH AND SEIzURE § 9 (2d ed. 1930).
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questioning. 6 If absent legal process the privilege was not supposed
to apply, why wasn't the federal government allowed all these years
to use evidence obtained by officers who did not bother to get any
97
warrant at all?
The view that police interrogation is not limited or affected by
the privilege against self-incrimination because it does not involve
any kind of judicial process for the taking of testimony had a great
deal more to commend it than merely the inherent force of its
"logic" or the self-restraint and tenderness of the exempted class
of interrogators. It must have had, in order for it to have been
taken so seriously for so long.
Among the forces at work was one of society's most effective
analgesics-"necessity," real or apparent. 98 Its influence may be
seen in numerous opinions. Although Justice Jackson recognized,
in his much-quoted concurring opinion in Watts v. Indiana, that
"if the State may... interrogate without counsel, there is no denying the fact that it largely negates the benefits of the constitutional
guaranty,"9 9 he was willing to let this "negation" occur for otherwise "the people of this country must discipline themselves to seeing their police stand by helplessly while those suspected of murder
prowl about unmolested."1x0 Again, the first axiom of Justice Frankfurter's dissertation on police interrogation and confessions in
Culombe v. Connecticut is: "Questioning suspects is indispensable
in law enforcement."'' 1 "Questioning," as Justice Frankfurter and
many others used the term, is a "shorthand" for questioning with96. See LANDYNSK!, op. cit. supra note 95, at 77. Indeed, Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), "the first Fourth Amendment case of real consequence" and, "in the
Court's own view (in 1925], the leading case on the subject of search and seizure"
(LANDYNSKI, op. cit. supra at 49), regarded the privilege against self-incrimination as the

constitutional backbone of the exclusionary rule.
97. I am only talking about "consistency" between the approach to searches and
seizures and self-incrimination on the one hand, and the approach to confessions
and self-incrimination on the other, not addressing myself to the merits of basing
the exclusionary rule on the fifth amendment. On the merits, as I have indicated
elsewhere, I think there is little to be said for it. See Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten
Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. Rlv.
1085, 1088-90 n.16 (1959).
98. It appears to be relatively easy, however, for a given generation to see how the
dangers which gripped a previous generation were "much exaggerated." The point
is made in Chafee, Thirty-Five Years with Freedom of Speech, 1 KAN. L. RKv. 1, 4-6

(1952).
99. 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949).
100. Id. at 61-62.
101. 367 U.S. 568, 578 (1961). There was no majority opinion. See text at notes
155-59 infra.
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out advising the suspect of his rights or permitting defense counsel,
friends or relatives to be present. 10 2
For the police to persist in interrogating a suspect after denying his specific request to contact his lawyer is unfair and coercive,
and any resulting confession should be excluded, contended peti0 3 Such a
tioner in Crooker v. California.1
rule, retorted a 5-4 majority of the Court, per Clark, J., "would have a . . . devastating
effect on enforcement of criminal law, for it would effectively preclude police questioning-fair as well as unfair-until the accused
was afforded opportunity to call his attorney."' 0 4 Had issue been
joined? The Court seemed to think so. What the Crooker majority
meant to say, I believe, was: We are convinced that precluding (or
postponing) police questioning until a suspect's specific request
to consult with his lawyer is honored would have a devastating
effect on law enforcement (on the eve of Miranda, law enforcement
would have been delighted to settle for this); 0 5 we must conclude,
102. Justice Frankfurter went on to say:
But if it is once admitted that questioning of suspects is permissible, whatever
reasonable means are needed to make the questioning effective must also be conceded to the police. . . . Often the place of questioning will have to be a police
interrogation room, [in part] because it is important to assure the proper atmosphere of privacy and non-distraction if questioning is to be made productive.....
Legal counsel for the suspect will generally prove a thorough obstruction to the investigation. Indeed, even to inform the suspect of his legal right
to keep silent will prove an obstruction.
367 U.S. at 579-80.
103. 857 U.S. 433 (1958).
104. Id. at 441.
105. It now appears that (in a number of jurisdictions, at least) recognition of a
right to retained counsel per request in Crooker would not have affected then-existing practice very much. Three years ago, Major Robert Murray, then chief of the
District of Columbia Police Department, testified that "over the years if a man was
arrested and said 'I want a lawyer' he was given an opportunity to call a lawyer,"
Hearings on S. 486 and H.R. 7525 Before the Senate Committee on the District of
Columbia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 462 (1963), and that the long-established practice was
that when a person said "'I want a lawyer,' why there is no use wasting time with
him. Just get him a lawyer," Id. at 470. Reporting on the practice in mid-Western
cities in the late 1950's, Professor Wayne LaFave disclosed:
[R]etained counsel often do enter a case shortly after arrest and immediately
confer with their clients or are present when the case reaches the district attorney's
office. In Milwaukee, they may actually sit in on the police interrogation. Indigent
suspects are not afforded counsel at these early stages.... Actually turning away
counsel who appears at the station to talk with his client is not a common
occurrence.
LAFAvE, ARRESr: THE DEcIsIoN To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 893-94 (Remington

ed. 1965).
On the eve of Miranda, law enforcement officers also would have been happy to
settle for the four hour "preliminary screening" period proposed by the Reporters
for the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. See MODEL CODE or PRn-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 4.04 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). Less than a decade ago, however,
the "dean" of American prosecutors had maintained that "frequently, even fortyeight to seventy-two hours is not enough." Coakley, Restrictions in the Law of Arrest,
52 Nw. U.L. Rav. 2, 9 (1957). More recently, a spokesman for the National Sheriff's
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therefore, that absent additional coercive factors, such questioning
is "fair."
Other significant factors operating over many decades to freeze
the status quo were the invisibility of the process-"no other case
comes to mind in which an administrative official is permitted the
broad discretionary power assumed by the police interrogator, together with the power to prevent objective recordation of the
facts"l'0 -and the failure of influential groups to identify with
those segments of our society which furnish most of the raw material
for the process. "One of the most powerful features of the Due
Process Model," Professor Herbert Packer recently observed, "is
that it thrives on visibility. People are willing to be complacent
about what goes on in the criminal process as long as they are not
too often or too explicitly reminded of the gory details."' 0 7 Society,
one might add, does not want to be reminded, does not "want to
know about criminals, but it does want them put away, and it is
incurious how this can be done provided it is done."' 08 It stings
too much to say it now, for we are too close to it, but someday it
will be said of the first two-thirds of the twentieth century: Too
many people, good people, viewed the typical police suspect and
his interrogator as garbage and garbage collector, respectively. (This
is every bit as unfortunate for the officer as it is for the suspect.)
Association thought forty-eight hours was "reasonable", Hearings on S. 486 and
H.R. 7525, supra, at 300 (Sheriff Canlis), and the head of the International Association of Chiefs of Police plumped for "at least twenty-four hours, excluding days when
courts are not in session," ibid. at 293 (Chief Schrotel).
In the 1963 Senate Hearings, David Acheson, then United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia, departed from what might be called "the police-prosecution
party line" by testifying that "in some very high percentage of the cases a confession is made if it is going to be made at all, within an hour or two, perhaps three
hours after arrest. . . . In the great majority of cases a confession is made fairly
promptly after arrest." Hearings on S. 486 and H.R. 7525, supra, at 443. In March of

this year, on the eve of the oral argument in Miranda, Chief John B. Layton of the
District of Columbia Police Department termed his department's current policy of
"limited stationhouse testimony-with an upper limit of three hours"--"helpful." He
disclosed that "admissions or statements" from suspects had been obtained in "about
half" the criminal cases involving questioning and that "about seventy-five per cent"
of these were obtained in one hour or less. Washington Post, March 4, 1966, p. B-2,
col. 1. Two days after Miranda was handed down, however, in a statement which
"appeared to contradict" his earlier views, Chief Layton pointed to the three-hour
maximum on stationhouse questioning as one reason why his department had "closed
what he believes to be an all-time low number of cases for Washington." Washington
Post, June 15, 1966, p. 22, col. 1.
106. Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52

J. CRsM. L. C. & P. S. 21, 44 (1961), reprinted in POLIE POwER

AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM

180 (Sowle ed. 1962).
107. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 64 (1964).
108. MacInnes, The Criminal Society, in Tim POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 101 (Rolph
ed. 1962).
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Moreover, with the inadvertent exception of those who wrote the
interrogation manuals (each, I suspect, equal to a dozen law review
articles in its impact on the Court),10 9 most law enforcement members and their spokesmen did their best to keep society comfortable
and blissfully ignorant. Not too surprisingly, they were much more
interested in "sanitizing" the proceedings in the interrogation
room than in disseminating the life-size details. As long ago as 1910
(when, everybody now agrees, things were in a terrible state), the
President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police assured us:
When the prisoner is taken into private quarters and there
interrogated as to his goings and comings, or asked to explain what
he may be doing with Mr. Brown's broken and dismantled jewelry
in his possession, to take off a rubber-heeled shoe he may be wearing
in order to compare it with a footprint in a burglarized premises,
or even to explain the blood stains on his hands and clothing, that,
hypothetically illustrates what would be called the "Third Degree."
S..

If a confession, preceded by the customary caution, obtained

through remorse or a desire to make reparation for a crime, is advanced by a prisoner, it surely should not be regarded as unfair ....
Volunteer confessions and admissions made after a prisoner has
been cautioned that what he states may be used against him, are
all there is to the so-called "Third Degree." ... 10
109. The American Civil Liberties Union briefs amicus curiae in Escobedo and
Miranda quote extensively from these manuals. Indeed, the Miranda brief reprints a
full chapter from O'HAA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1959). In turn,
the majority opinion in Miranda devotes six full pages, 384 U.S. at 449-54, to extracts
from various police manuals and texts "which document procedures employed with
success in the past, and which recommend various other effective tactics," id. at 448.
Although such manuals had been available for many years, e.g., KIND, PouCE INTERRoGATION (1940) and MULBaa, INTERROGATION (1951), so far as I can tell neither
law review articles nor Supreme Court briefs made much use of them until quite
recently. As late as 1964 most of these manuals were not to be found in the libraries
of at least two of our greatest law schools. Perhaps the first law review writer to make
extensive use of these texts was Bernard Weisberg of the Chicago bar (see note 106
supra), who later turned up as one of the ACLU lawyers in the Escobedo case.
Two weeks after, Miranda was handed down, Thomas C. Lynch, the Attorney
General of California, in Washington for a meeting of the National Crime Commission
of which he is a member, reported that a preliminary survey indicated "wide use"
in his state of the police interrogation manuals criticized by the Court. He disclosed
that he was considering a "purge" of all such manuals. Washington Post, June 30,
1966, p. E2, col. 3. Professor Philip Zimbardo, who made the strong charge that "it
is my professional opinion as a psychologist who has been concerned with the experimental modification of attitudes and behavior that these techniques [those ilustrated in the manuals] represent a highly sophisticated application of psychological
principles which for many people are more compelling and coercive than physical
torture" (Zimbardo, "An Analysis of Pre-Arraignment Interrogation Techniques and
Their Psychological Implications," p. 26, paper read at American Psychological Association Meeting, Sept. 3, 1966), reported that he had "verified that these manuals are
used in training interrogators by calling several police academies," id. at 10.
110. Major Sylvester's comments are reported in Larson, Present Police and Legal
Methods for the Determination of the Innocence or Guilt of the Suspect, 16 J. GRIM.
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As recently as July of this year, the veteran special agent of the
Kansas Bureau of Investigation, Alvin A. Dewey, of In Cold Blood
fame, told the Senate Sub-committee on Constitutional Amendments:
What is wrong with an officer exercising persistence and patience or showing confidence? Isn't that what any good salesman
demonstrates in selling insurance or a car? And a law enforcement
officer should be a good salesman in selling a suspect on telling the
truth, proving his innocence or guilt. But a salesman cannot do
his job if a competitor is standing by, and that is the situation for
the law enforcement officer with the presence of an attorney while
interrogating a suspect.
As to the description of an interrogation room, I wish to define
it as a room where people can talk in privacy which is nothing
more than an attorney desires in talking to his client or a doctor in
talking to his patient ....

[These rooms] bear no resemblance to

torture chambers as some may wish, to think, and in fact some are
equipped with air conditioning, carpeting, and upholstered furniture.111
What I have said so far does not fully account for the persistence of the de facto inquisitorial system. In the late 1920's and
early '30's, complacency about the system was shaken-at least for
a while-by the notorious cases of Ziang Sun Wan v. United States" 2
and People v. Doran"3 and by the shocking disclosure of the Wickersham Commission."

4

Still the system survived. Why? Probably

because, in addition to the factors I have already mentioned, the
practice had become so widespread and intrenched by this time that
even most of its critics despaired of completely uprooting it in
the foreseeable future. A broad, fundamental attack on the system
might well have failed completely; elimination of the more aggravated forms of coercion commanded a high priority and alone appeared feasible. In this regard, the pessimistic views of Zechariah
Chafee, co-author of the famous report to the Wickersham Commission on "the third degree,""15 are instructive:" 8
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 222-25 (1925) and reported in part in 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
316-17 (3d ed. 1940).
111. Statement of Alvin A. Dewey before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July 21, 1966, p. 2 (mimeo.)
(on file in the University of Michigan Law Library).
112. 266 U.S. 1 (1924). See text at notes 188-89 infra.
11. 246 N.Y. 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927). See text at notes 190-92 infra.
114. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAw OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAw ENFORCEMENT (1981) (Wickersham Report).

115. See note 85 supra.
116. Chafee, Remedies for the Third Degree, Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1931, pp. 621,
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Big jumps in policy may be unattainable or undesirable. [What
would Chafee have said of Escobedo and Miranda?]Bad as the third
degree is, we should be very cautious about disrupting the police
department and the courts in the hope of abolishing it.
Let us begin by considering two simple remedies which are free
from the foregoing objections.
The first is to shorten this danger period by obtaining the
prompt production of the prisoner before a magistrate, after which
he should be out of the hands of the police. This is the situation in
Boston, and appears to contribute to the virtual nonexistence of
the third degree in that city .. . . There is no opportunity for
protracted interrogations lasting over several days and nights, which
are common in cities where production in court is illegally delayed.
Violence is less probable when scars will not have time to heal
before the magistrate sees the prisoner next day. This remedy involves no new law; practically all states require prompt production in court. It introduces no starting innovation in police
methods, but merely hastens an act which the police are accustomed to perform. Of course, enforcement of this law will not always be an easy matter. The same motives which cause the police
in many cities to investigate brutally also lead them to prolong the
time of investigation illegally. However, excessive length of confinement is an offense which the judges can discover and correct
more easily than secret coercion ....
Secondly, official records should be kept of the exact time of arrest and of detention; of the transfers of prisoners and the places
to which they are taken; of interviews by the police with prisoners
and the time interrogations begin and end; and (as in Boston) of
injuries to prisoners found visible during a daily examination. Facts
of this nature fit naturally into the records customarily kept in
police stations and jails.
The two remedies just recommended have the advantage of forming a natural part of the existing routine of police stations and
magistrates courts ....
In England, the police are forbidden to interrogate a suspect
after his arrest or involuntary detention; thus there is no danger of
their using brutality or other pressure to obtain the desired answers .... However, it is doubtful if this remedy could be successfully transferred to the United States, at least in the near future ....
American police officials . . . attach extreme importance to the
questioning of arrested persons. They would consider the adoption
of the English rule a serious crippling of their activities, and until
they feel otherwise it would only be one more law which they would
be tempted to violate. How could they be forced to obey it? It is
hard enough to prevent policemen from using physical violence on
suspects; it would be far harder to prevent them from asking a few
625-26, 650. (Emphasis added.) See also Warner, How Can the Third Degree Be Eliminated?, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS RaV. 24 (1940), and the extract from it in note 131 infra.
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questions. We had better get rid of the rubber hose and twenty-four
hour grillings before we undertake to compel or persuade the police
to give up questioning altogether.
[The remedies recommended in this article] require no constitutional amendments and no legislation, so that their adoption involves no long delay. But immediate success must not be expected.
The third degree is deeply rooted in official habits in many cities,
and is not likely to disappear entirely until the officials have been
persuaded that it is bad and unnecessary.

IV. THE McNabb-Anderson BRIEFS: THE
THAT THE PRIVILEGE

APPLIES

TO POLICE

AGREES
BUT . . .

GOVERNMENT

INTERROGATION,

Until Miranda at least, very few of our states adopted the "simple" and relatively modest remedy of "shortening the danger period"
by obtaining the prompt production of the prisoner before a magistrate. 117 Howevcr, a dozen years after Professor Chafee wrote the
aforementioned article the Supreme Court did resort to this remedy,
as is well known, in the exercise of its supervisory powers over the
administration of federal criminal justice. 118 Neither the opinion
of the Court nor the briefs of counsel contain citations to the
Chafee article, but the McNabb opinion reads as if its author, Justice Frankfurter, had perused the writings of his former colleague
more than once.
One would never know it in the midst of all the beating of
breasts and gnashing of teeth" 9 which greeted both McNabb and
the Mallory case 120 which reaffirmed it, but (as the Chafee article
plainly indicates) the new federal rule marked a "compromise" between the objectionable existing practice and the "drastic proposals"
then being advanced. That McNabb was a "compromise" became
quite apparent' 2' in the wake of Escobedo, but it had not escaped
117. In most instances, the courts have not even discussed whether in-custody
investigation by the police is legal, concentrating instead on determining the
point at which the police have gone too far in their interrogation practices so
that the confessor should be regarded as coerced. In the few cases where the issue
of illegality has been pressed, most state courts have refused to follow the federal
courts in excluding evidence obtained during periods of illegal delay and hence
have not needed to mark out the boundaries of proper police conduct short of
that extreme characterized as coercion.
Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CArLF. L.
REV. 11, 22 (1962). See also Schaefer, Comments [on Kamisar, Has the Court Left the
Attorney Behind?, 54 Ky. L.J. 464 (1966)], 54 KY. L.J. 521-22 (1966).
118. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
119. See generally Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale
and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958); Note, 68 YALE L.J. 1003 (1959).
120. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
121. Shortly after Escobedo was decided, two former federal prosecutors proposed
a combination of the McNabb-Mallory rule and objective recording of all question-
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the government lawyers who argued McNabb and the companion
case of Anderson v. United States.12 2 Although they had urged the
Court not to "hold inadmissible a confession made during the subsistence of any unlawful practice regardless of whether the confession was voluntary,"' 123 the government lawyers devoted more space
in their brief to "an even more extreme" possibility:
We submit also that the Court should not adopt an even more
extreme rule requiring the exclusion of confessions obtained during
cross-examination of persons in the custody of the police. The shocking conditions revealed by appellate court decisions and by the researches of investigators naturally give rise to the suggestion that
the evils must be ended by abolishing the system of police examination which lies at the root of the evils. The ability to use as evidence
confessions obtained by cross-examination is said to lead a lax
police force to rely upon confessions and not upon sound investigatory techniques in tracing clues and uncovering evidence. Similarly it is suggested that proper interrogation too easily becomes
bullying and bullying becomes brutality. The evil effects of the
resulting "third degree" upon the whole system of law observance
and law enforcement can scarcely be exaggerated. Finally, proponents of this view point to the low rate of crime and high rate of
crime detection in Great Britain where, apparently, the police are
not permitted to124interrogate a prisoner except to clarify a volunteered statement.
Some of the reasons advanced by the government to stay the
Court's hand in McNabb and Anderson sound very much like the
reasons urged by the federal and state governments a quarter-cen25
tury later in Miranda:
If a remedy is needed in addition to existing sanctions, the
remedy should be administrative or legislative but not judicial.
Two reasons support this conclusion. First, the courts are ill equipped
to make the investigation necessary before the settled principles
may be overturned. Second, the courts have no discretion in the
choice of a remedy. The administrative officials may prescribe and
enforce regulations designed to protect prisoners against the "third
ing at places controlled by the police as a "more workable and less drastic means"
of controlling interrogation abuses than the presence of counsel at these sessions.
Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 49 MINN. L. Rav. 47, 85 (1964).
122. 318 U.S. 350 (1943). Although today McNabb is the much more famous case,
the government used its brief in Anderson as the vehicle for extended treatment of

the problem.
123. Brief for United States, pp. 49-50.

124. Id. at 52-53.
125. Cf. Brief for the State of New York and Twenty-Six other States as Amid
Curiae, in "Miranda Cases," pp. 23, 35-38; Brief for United States, p. 45, Westover v.
United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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degree." If the legislative branch determined to forbid interrogation by the police and to exclude extrajudicial confessions thus obtained from evidence, it might meet the demands of law enforcement by providing a substitute such as an immediate examination
by the prosecuting Attorney in the presence of the counsel for the
accused, or perhaps some system of quasi-judicial examination accompanied by a limitation, by constitutional amendment where
necessary, of the privilege against self-incrimination. 126
How an "immediate examination by the prosecuting attorney in
the presence of the counsel for the accused" could possibly "meet
the demands of law enforcement"-as law enforcement conceived
those demands--is not made clear. Nor why a quasi-judicial examination of the accused might require a modification of the privilege although nonjudicial examination did not. For, and this is
perhaps the most extraordinary feature of this extraordinary brief,
the government agreed that the privilege against self-incrimination
controlled the admissibility of confessions (as I read the brief, with
some blinking, in state as well as federal cases), although, for one
thing, it had to "sanitize" police interrogation in order to meet this
standard:
[T]he guarantees of the privilege against self-incrimination and
of due process of law are limitations put upon the state in protection of the individual against invasions of "his indefeasible right"
of personal security, personal liberty, and the privacies of life, where
the right has not been forfeited by a conviction for crime. See
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630. But the constitutional prohibition is not laid upon only the most obnoxious practices. Even
a restrained secret interrogation may gradually turn to mental or
physical torture .... Therefore, the accused is given the privilege,
which he may choose to exercise or not as he pleases, to check the
danger at the outset by refusing to answer any incriminating questions; if he refuses, the state must not use "physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him."
The Constitution grants this privilege specifically by the provision in the Fifth Amendment that no man "shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself," and it grants
the privilege impliedly in the due process clause of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments.
An accused person feels compulsion to speak, at the outset, in
the hope of establishing his innocence and, at the end, when that is
gone, in the weight of his conscience, or in the hope of obtaining
leniency. But in such a case, the state cannot be said to have coerced
126. Brief for United States, pp. 55-56, Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350

(1943).
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the answers. The state has not invaded any right of personal security

or privacy against the will of the accused, or exerted moral or
physical compulsion to extort the communication. Such a confession, therefore, is admissible.
[A] confession made in answer to interrogation by the police
may be admitted in evidence without infringement of any constitutional right, provided that the accused is left free to end the
examination into his guilt or innocence by a refusal to answer, and
provided that his will is respected and not subjugated to the will
12 7
of his accusers.
If there has ever been an alleged "coerced confession" case
worth litigating where the defendant was given either the privilege
against self-incrimination to exercise "as he pleases" or the freedom
to "end the examination" by a simple refusal to answer, I am unaware of it. At any rate, not until Miranda did the Court strive to
check "the danger [of secret interrogation] at the outset" by requiring that the suspect be fully and fairly advised that he has a
"right of silence" which he may "choose to exercise . . . as he
pleases." This, as I understand it, is what much of the shouting is
about. Not until Miranda did the Court make plain that even
though the suspect may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements he is "free to end the examination" by indicating that he does not wish to be interrogated further. Again,
this, I take it, is what much of the shouting is about.
It is no mean feat to put beyond the reach of the privilege those
proceedings in which a man is being "compelled"-in almost pristine form-to testify against himself. But it takes real dexterity to
do what the government did in McNabb and Anderson, i.e., purport to apply the privilege to a phase of the criminal process which
had grown up more or less accidentally and extralegally, yet conclude that this application of the constitutional provision does not
change things very much. In order to accomplish such an extraordinary feat, the Government not only had to tidy up the facts to
suit the standard, but also had to loosen the standard to suit the
facts. As the Government perceived the matter, the privilege against
self-incrimination turned out to be little, if anything, more than
the "voluntary" test masquerading under a different label. Whether
the route taken in arriving at this result be viewed as augmenting
the common law and due process standards a bit or as diluting the
force of the privilege (at least as it had been construed in more
127. Id. at 39-40, 46, 48. (Emphasis added.)
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formal settings) a good deal, all the tests, even the one based on
"trustworthiness" wound up in a single ball of wax:
It is familiar and settled law that a "voluntary" confession
should be admitted into evidence, and that a "coerced" confession
should be excluded. Whatever the logic of the criticisms, this test
is applicable whether the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination, or the law of evidence be invoked as ground for the
objection.
The privilege is not to be "compelled" to give evidence against
oneself. And in the leading cases setting aside convictions based
upon confessions because due process was denied, the Court carefully pointed out that "the undisputed facts showed that compulsion was applied." Chambers v. Florida . . . Coercion and compulsion exist in this sense when the accused is deprived "of his free
choice, to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer," when his will is
broken so that he will make whatever statement his inquisitors may
desire .... A confession obtained from a Chinese suffering physical
pain who was held incommunicado and questioned for seven days
and all of one night is obtained by compulsion. Wan v. United
States, 266 U.S. 1. [Is this example supposed to illuminate the
meaning of "compelled" to be a witness against oneself?]
Comparison of the constitutional requirement with the criterion
of testimonial worth shows that they are essentially the same both
in abstract statement and in practical application. Both are summarized in the words "voluntary" and "compulsion".... In theory,
it may be that a man is less ready to accuse himself falsely than
he is to surrender his will to remain silent, but it is doubtful that
so fine a line can be drawn in practice. The two aims, to admit
true confessions and to abolish abuses, are overlapping; the ultimate
test in each case is whether the confession is what the accused
was
128
willing to say or what the accusers wished him to tell them.
As the government's approach in McNabb and Anderson well
illustrates, excluding the privilege from the interrogation room is
not the only way to reconcile the proceedings inside with the fifth
amendment. One may also let the privilege in, but "balance" it.
"Outside" the interrogation room, unlike first amendment rights
whose assertion "to bar governmental interrogation . . . always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public
interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown,"' 129 "a
proper claim of the privilege against self-incrimination . . . af128. Id. at 28, 41-42, 48-49.
129. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) (Harlan, J.).
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ford[s] a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circumstances."''3 0
"Outside," the most pressing demands of national security cannot
override the privilege; "inside," evidently, routine law enforcement
needs may, and often should, prevail. That, at least, is how I view
the government's plea of a quarter-century ago to maintain the
status quo, to stick with the old "voluntariness" test (alias the privilege against self-incrimination):
If all extra judicial confessions were excluded from evidence,
there would be less aggression against these liberties because the incentive would be largely removed. On the other hand, it is essential
that crime be detected and important that all data having testimonial worth be used to establish the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Thus, there is a conflict between the demands of individual
liberty and the public interest in efficient law enforcement. The
test of voluntariness seems to us to resolve this conflict at the line
marked by the Constitution. It should not, we submit, be modified
131
by the courts to be more stringent.

As late as 1966, the dissenters in Mirandaseemed to agree....
V. Ti

"VoLuNTAUNESS" TEST: "A WORKABLE AND EFFECTIVE
MEANS OF DEALING wrrH CONFESSIONS IN A JUDICIAL MANNER"

Although Justice Clark would modify the old test,3 2 he looks
back on it as one "which we are accustomed to administering and
130. Ibid.
131. Brief for United States, op. cit. supra note 126, at 38.
A short time earlier, Sam Bass Warner, principal draftsman of the Uniform Arrest
Act, who was said to be one of the few professors who had "accompanied the police
on their tours of duty in order to learn and report the true facts," Wilson, Police
Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, in PoLIcE PowFR AND
INDIVMUAL FREEDoM 21, 26 (Sowle ed. 1962), had articulated "the conffict" and the
need to strike "a proper balance" much more crisply:
The difficulties confronting a defendant who desires to reserve his story until
trial are well-known. When he is arrested, the police will endeavor to make him
.,come across." Whether they will violate the Fifth Amendment by compelling
him to be a witness against himself, depends upon what is meant by "compelling." If the term "compel" includes a two or three hour examination during
which several police officers urge him to confess and do their best to confuse
and entrap him into a confession, then the Fifth Amendment is violated in
every city in the United States.
If in their effort to break down the suspect, our police stopped after giving
him a severe grilling for a few hours, we might believe that the Fifth Amendment was being violated and regret that the liberty of the individual was not
better respected, but we should have no serious ground for complaint. In fact,
it may well be that a proper balance between the individual interest in freedom
from compulsory self-incrimination and the social interest in the discovery of
crime requires that suspects be subjected to such a cross-examination. The situation becomes serious only when the police go further and indulge in what is
popularly known as the "third degree."
Warner, supra note 116, at 25. See also notes 141-43 infra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 4 and 11 supra.
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which we know from our cases are effective instruments in protecting persons in police custody."' 13 For Justice Harlan, the preEscobedo-Miranda cases "show that there exists a workable and
effective means of dealing with confessions in a judicial manner"'134
and that "the court has developed an elaborate, sophisticated, and
sensitive approach to admissibility," one "ever more familiar to the
lower courts."' 13 5
Justice Clark's enthusiasm for the pre-Escobedo test was not
always so abundant. Only five years earlier he had referred to "the
elusive, measureless standard of psychological coercion heretofore
developed in this Court by accretion on almost an ad hoc, case-bycase basis."'136 And long before that (in a search and seizure setting)
he had scored the "uncertainty" and "unpredictability" generated
by "a case by case approach to due process in which inchoate notions of propriety concerning local police conduct guide our decisions," maintaining that by such an approach "we do not shape the
conduct of local police one whit; unpredictable reversals on dissimilar fact situations are not likely to curb the zeal of those police
and prosecutors who may be intent on racking up a high percentage
of successful prosecutions.' 37 As for Justice Harlan, in stressing
that the late, lamented test gave "ample recognition to society's interest in suspect questioning as an instrument of law enforcement,' 138 he succeeded, it seems to me, in violently shaking the
aforementioned assurance by Justice Clark that the pre-EscobedoMiranda test was "an effective instrument in protecting persons in
police custody":
Cases countenancing quite significant pressures can be cited
without difficulty, and the lower courts may often have been yet
39
more tolerant.
133. 384 U.S. at 503.
134. Id. at 506.
135. Id. at 508.
136. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 455 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
137. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring).
138. 384 U.S. at 509.
139. Ibid., referring to the cases synopsized in Herman, The Supreme Court and
Restrictions on Police Interrogation,25 OHIO ST. UJ. 449, 456 & nn.36-39 (1964). See
also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 524 (1963) (Clark, J., joined by Harlan,
Stewart and White, JJ., dissenting):

r ot] even the fact that one is "held incommunicado, is subjected to questioning

y officers for long periods, and deprived of the advice of counsel," without a
showing that he had "so lost his freedom of action" that the confession was not
his own, requires a reversal under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lisenba v. California [314 U.S. 219, 240-41 (1941)]. Finally, the fact that police officers violated
state statutes in their treatment of the petitioner does "not furnish an answer"
to the question whether a confession was voluntarily made. Id. at 235; see
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
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One not too distant example is Stroble v. California, 343 U.S.
181 [1952], in which the suspect was kicked and threatened after his
arrest, questioned a little later for two hours, and isolated from a
lawyer trying to see him; the resulting confession was held admissible.140
The Mirandamajority contended that "the absurdity" of denying that a confession obtained under typical "interrogation room"
circumstances "is compelled" is "aptly portrayed" by Professor
Arthur Sutherland's hypothetical of a well-to-do testatrix who is
"captured" by the would-be heirs who "put her in a carefully designed room, out of touch with everyone but themselves . .. [and]
keep her secluded there for hours while they make insistent demands, weary her with contradictions of her assertions that she
wants to leave her money to [someone else], and finally induce her
to execute the will in their favor." 1 4'
Justice Harlan's retort was that the need of law enforcement
"is, of course, what makes so misleading the Court's comparison
of a probate judge readily setting aside as involuntary the will of
an old lady badgered and beleagured by the new heirs."' 142 However,
after posing his hypothetical, Professor Sutherland had commented:
At once one will hear the response that the testatrix is not a
criminal; that obtaining a surrender of rights from a criminal is
different; that the interest of the state demands that criminals be
not coddled. That is to say we are told that a man with his life at
stake should be able to surrender an ancient constitutional right
of a little
to remain silent, under compulsions which in a surrender
43
property would obviously make the transaction void.

This is precisely what Justice Harlan seems to be telling us.
The view that the "voluntariness test" effectively protected suspects seems questionable, in large part because Justice Harlan's
sanguine attitude about the "workability" of the "voluntariness"
test and the test's growing familiarity to the lower courts seems unwarranted. His attitude hardly finds support in his own recognition
that the Court "never pinned [the "voluntariness rubric"] ... down
140. 384 U.S. at 509 n.5. As Justice Harlan recognizes elsewhere, see text at note
145 infra, in the evolution of the "totality of circumstances" test the use of physical
violence in obtaining a confession emerged as a per se ground for inadmissibility,
but "causation" questions remained. Stroble, sentenced to death for first degree
murder, did not prevail in the Supreme Court because circumstances indicated that
he had confessed "quite independently of any duress by the police." 343 U.S. at 191

(Clark, J.).
141. 384 U.S. at 457-58 n.26, quoting from Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79
HARV. L. REv. 21, 37 (1965).
142. 384 U.S. at 516 & n.13. Compare note 131 supra.
143. Sutherland, supra note 141, at 37.
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to a single meaning, but on the contrary infused it with a number
of different values"1 44 or in his acknowledgment that "apart from
direct physical coercion ...

no single default or fixed combination

of them guaranteed exclusion and synopses of the cases would serve
little use because the overall gauge has been steadily changing,
usually in the direction of restricting admissibility."1 45 Nor does
the touted workability, effectiveness, sophistication and sensitivity
of the old test find support in the Bator-Vorenberg article (which
Justice Harlan quotes with approval):
In fact, the concept of involuntariness seems to be used by the
courts as a shorthand to refer to practices which are repellent to
civilized standards of decency or which, under the circumstances,
which
are thought to apply a degree of pressure to an individual
46
unfairly impairs his capacity to make a rational choice.'
Nor can the defenders of the old test gain much comfort from the
paragraph (which the dissenting Justices do not quote) immediately
preceding the one quoted above:
Judicial decisions speak in terms of the "voluntariness" of a
confession, but the term itself provides little guidance. To the
extent "voluntariness" has made a determination of the state of
an individual's will the crucial question, it has not assisted analysis.
Except where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks
capacity for conscious choice, all incriminating statements--even
those made under brutal treatment are "voluntary" in the sense of
representing a choice of alternatives. On the other hand, if "voluntariness" incorporates notions of "but-for" cause, the question
should be whether the statement would have been made even absent inquiry or other official action. Under such a test, virtually no
statement would be voluntary because very few people give instatements in the absence of official action of some
criminating
47
kind.1
144. 384 U.S. at 507.
145. Id. at 508.
146. Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel,
66 CoLuM. L. REv. 62, 73 (1966), quoted with approval, 384 U.S. at 507 n.4; cf. Kamisar,
What Is An "Involuntary" Confession?, 17 RUTGERs L. Rlv. 728, 745-46 (1963):
There is much talk in Culombe [v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)] of "involuntariness" and the "suction process;" of "draining" the "capacity for freedom
of choice"; of "overreaching," "overbearing" or "breaking" the "will." But are
these words and phrases any more illuminating than say, the talk of yesteryear
about "affected with a public interest," "subject to the exercise of the police
power," or "devoted to the public use?" Is "involuntariness" or "coercion" or
"breaking the will" (or its synonyms) little more than a fiction intended to vilify
certain "effective" interrogation methods? Is "voluntariness" or "mental freedom"
or "self-determination" (or its equivalents) little more than a fiction designed to
beautify certain other interrogation techniques?
147. Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 146, at 72-73.

HeinOnline -- 65 Mich. L. Rev. 97 1966-1967

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:59

Justice Harlan did not pause to document his assertion that the
pre-Escobedo approach to the admissibility of confessions-which
was undergoing "a continuing re-evaluation on the facts of each
case of how much pressure on the subject was permissible"' 4 8-was
growing "ever more familiar to the lower courts." Similarly, although Professors Bator and Vorenberg talk about "the courts"
using the voluntary-involuntary terminology as a "shorthand," they
do not cite a single lower court case--only a host of United States
Supreme Court cases and one secondary authority whose complaint,
inter alia, is that by continuing to define the "voluntariness" required by due process in terms of the old threadbare generalities
and empty abstractions (e.g., "made . . . freely and voluntarily and

without fear of punishment or hope of reward") and by failing to
advise juries of specific types of police misconduct relevant to the
issue, the state trial courts were permitting the term to continue
to be used in its ordinary, everyday (and unhelpful) sense. 149 Indeed, in Haynes v. Washington,'5" which marks the "end of the
line" for the old test, the jury was instructed, in effect, to preclude
from its consideration of the "voluntariness" issue that the accused
was not reminded he was under arrest, was not cautioned he could
remain silent, nor warned that his answers could be used against
him, nor advised of his right to counsel. 151 True, although not relied on as a separate ground of reversal, these instructions were
regarded by the 54 Haynes majority as raising "a serious and
substantial question whether a proper constitutional standard was
applied by the jury.'1

52

There seems to be a significant difference,

however, between forbidding a trial court from precluding consideration of these factors and requiring the court to instruct affirmatively that they must be taken into account.
The most ambitious attempt to bring order, coherence and
clarity to the "involuntary" or "coerced" confession field, the most
148. 384 U.S. at 507. (Emphasis in the original.)
149. See Kamisar, supra note 146, at 752-53.
Actually, as Professors Bator and Vorenberg point out in the opening footnote,
since their article is "an informal working paper, designed to be used as a basis for
discussion," it "contains no documentation of any sort." However, the authors are
the principal draftsmen of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, and, understandably, the commentary to the proposed code, written at
about the same time as the article, follows it closely. The passage quoted by Justice
Harlan appears verbatim in the commentary, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 167 (rent. Draft No. 1, 1966), and when I refer to Professors Bator and Vorenberg's documentation for this passage I mean that which is contained in the commentary to the code.

150. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
151. Id. at 518.
152. Ibid.
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arduous effort to develop "a set of principles [in terms of the old
test] which could be easily applied in any coerced-confession situation,"'153 was the late Justice Frankfurter's sixty-seven page "treatise"'1 4 in Culombe v. Connecticut.155 What was the result of these
Herculean labors? Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark and
Whittaker, "agreed to what my Brother Frankfurter has written
in delineation of the general principles governing police interrogation... and as to the factors which should guide federal judicial
review of state action in this field"s-"-but reached the opposite
result. 5 7 Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, took a different
route than did Justice Frankfurter, but reached the same result. 158
The Chief Justice, in the course of joining the separate concurring
opinion of Justice Brennan, would only say of the general principles enunciated by Justice Frankfurter: "On an abstract level,
I find myself in agreement with some portions of the opinion and
in disagreement with other portions."' 59 Only one member of the
Court, Justice Stewart, joined in Justice Frankfurter's dissertation.
Two years after Culombe and only a year before Escobedo, the
Court split 54 in Haynes. 6° Justice Clark, joined by Harlan, Stewart and White, JJ., regarded "the Court's reversal... [as] an abrupt
departure from the rule laid down in the cases of this Court and
an enlargement of the requirements heretofore visited upon state
courts in confession cases."' 6 ' For the majority's determination that
the Haynes confession was "involuntary" the four dissenters could
"find no support in any of the thirty-three cases decided on the
question by this Court."'162 Does this sound like the Supreme Court,
let alone the lower courts, had grown "accustomed to administering" the "voluntariness" test?
For me, the strongest evidence of the ineffectiveness and unworkability of the old test was yet to come. It came one week after
the Miranda case, when, having declined to give retroactive effect
153. So described by the Chief Justice in his concurring opinion, 367 U.S. at 636.
154. Again so described by the Chief Justice, 367 U.S. at 636. The Miranda dissenters were gracious enough not to elaborate on the Chief Justice's preference in
Culombe for developing "the law on a case-by-case approach," declaring "legal principles only in the context of specific factual situations," and avoiding "expounding
more than is necessary for the decision of a given case." Ibid.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

367 U.S. 568 (1961).
Id. at 642 (dissenting opinion).
Ibid.
Id. at 637-41.
Id. at 686.
373 U.S. 503 (1963).
Id. at 521.
Id. at 525.
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to Escobedo and Miranda,163 the Court applied the old test (on collateral attack) in Davis v. North Carolina.164

As indicated earlier, 165 in challenging the admissibility of his
confessions, Elmer Davis, Jr., was more fortunate than most in his
predicament. He could point to a specific notation on the arrest
sheet: "Do not allow anyone to see Davis. Or allow him to use the

telephone."' 166 As Chief Judge Sobeloff pointed out, "rarely do police

officials make a written declaration, as they did here, of a design to
deny their prisoner's right to counsel and his other constitutional
rights."' 6 17 Davis could also point to the uncontested fact that no
one other than the police had spoken to him during the sixteen

days of detention and interrogation that preceded his confessions.
The Supreme Court had "never sustained the use of a confession
obtained after such a lengthy period of detention and interrogation
as was involved in this case."'06 However, this did not suffice in the

Superior and Supreme Courts of North Carolina in the year 1960.19
Nor did it impress the federal district court, which first denied him
163. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
Johnson recalls Judge Qua's observation a decade ago: "Practical considerations
may impinge heavily and divert the development of theory from its straight logical
course. We all know this occurs from time to time in our own courts and sometimes
to the great advantage of the law and the community. Similar forces operate in
Washington." Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. CH. L. REv. 143, 147 (1957). Although
"the advantages" to "the community" of declining to apply Escobedo and Miranda
retroactively are considerable, I think Johnson was wrongly decided, for reasons suggested by a series of leading questions in HALL & KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 503 (2d ed. 1966). How can the Court say that "while Escobedo and Miranda
provide important new safeguards against the use of unreliable statements at trial,
the nonretroactivity of these decisions will not preclude persons whose trials have
already been completed from invoking the same safeguards as part of an involuntariness claim"? 384 U.S. at 730. (Emphasis added.) If, as seems plain, Escobedo and
Miranda indicate dissatisfaction with-and lack of confidence in-the actual operation of the old "voluntariness" and "totality of circumstances" tests, just as Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) manifests dissatisfaction with and lack of confidence in the old Betts "prejudice" and "special circumstances" standards, how can
it be sufficient that "our law on coerced confessions is available for persons whose
trials have already been completed"? 384 U.S. at 730.
I hasten to add, however, that here again, compare note 8 supra, the Court was
faced with a "damned if it did and damned if it didn't" issue. If the Court had
given the new confession rulings retroactive effect, I venture to say the roar of
disapproval would have been deafening. Not only would many law enforcement
officers have proclaimed "chaos" and "catastrophe," but not a few law professors would
have chided the Court for "pretending the Constitution is now what it always was"
and for "inhibiting judicial creativity."
164. 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
165. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
166. 384 U.S. at 744.
167. 339 F.2d 770, 780 (4th Cir. 1964). Judge Bell joined in Chief Judge Sobeloff's
dissenting opinion.
168. 384 U.S. at 752.
169. 253 N.C. 86, 116 S.E.2d 365 (1960).
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an evidentiary hearing, 170 and then, when reversed on this point,171
found his confessions to have been "voluntary.' 1 72 Nor, in the year
1964, was it quite enough for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, which upheld denial of the writ by a 3-2
vote. 73
The readiness with which the state and lower federal courts
passing on the admissibility of Davis' confessions accepted dubious
police claims, and the looseness with which they stated (or, more
accurately, failed to state) "the facts," is hardly calculated to inspire
confidence in the workability and effectiveness of the test-from
the defendant's point of view, at any rate. In affirming Davis' conviction, a unanimous Supreme Court of North Carolina observed:
The prisoner was advised he need not make a statement; that
if he did it might be used against him.
The prisoner asked to see his sister, whom the officers searched
for, after some difficulty found, and delivered the prisoner's message. She appeared at the jail and Captain McCall admitted her to
a private conference with the prisoner.' 74
The prisoner's sister was admitted to a private conference with
him, but, the state court neglected to point out, not until he
had already confessed after having been interrogated "forty-five
minutes or an hour or maybe a little more" each day for sixteen
days. 75 Similarly, the state court failed to note that there was no
indication in the record that the prisoner was advised of his rights
until the sixteenth day-after he had confessed orally but before he
16
had signed the written confession.
After holding a habeas corpus hearing, the federal district court
had little difficulty concluding "from the totality of circumstances
in this case that the confession was the product of a rational intellect and a free will."' 77 How did it deal with the tell-tale nota-

tion on the police blotter directing that Davis be held incommunicado? It made no reference whatever to this incongruous item in its
five page opinion, four of which are devoted to the "historical facts."
Moreover, although the head of the detective division admitted
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

196 F. Supp. 488 (E.D.N.C. 1961).
310 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1962).
221 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1963).
339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964).
253 N.C. 86, 94, 96, 116 S.E.2d 365, 370, 371 (1960).
See 384 U.S. at 745-47; 339 F.2d at 783 (dissenting opinion).
See id. at 739; 339 F-2d at 782 (dissenting opinion).
221 F. Supp. 494, 499 (E.D.N.C. 1963).
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that Charlotte police sought and received permission from the warden of the state prison to keep Davis "temporarily" in their custody, primarily for the reason that they suspected him of the rapemurder to which he later confessed, 1 8 they managed to convince
the federal district court that, for the first twelve of the sixteen days
he was their prisoner, they had refrained from asking Davis any
questions about the murder, but rather confined their questions
to thefts and unlawful entries committed by him after his escape. 1'79
"The notation on the arrest record creates suspicions," conceded
the 3-2 majority of the Fourth Circuit, "but such suspicions cannot overcome the positive evidence that the notation had no practical effect or influence upon what was done and that help rather
than hindrance was offered to [Davis] in his one effort to contact
someone outside the prison walls."'8 s0 This is the police version.
The Fourth Circuit opinion pointed out elsewhere that Davis'
sister had testified at the habeas corpus hearing that "she twice
went to see her brother in the Charlotte City Jail, but each time
was turned away."'' The district court, however, "did not believe
her, finding, as the officers testified, that neither she nor anyone
else was turned away . . . ."182
What, if anything, one might ask, does the foregoing discussion
prove? The United States Supreme Court reversed (Clark and Harlan, JJ., dissenting), did it not? Yes, indeed, but it should never be
forgotten that in the thirty years since Brown v. Mississippi,8 3 the
Supreme Court has taken an average of about one state confession
case per year.8 4 How fared the many defendants all these years who,
in the midst of the confusion and conflict so characteristic of "factual litigation" in this area, could not fall back on extraordinarily
helpful "objective facts," as could Davis? How fared the many defendants whose cases did not receive the meticulous attention each
Justice gives "death penalty" cases marked in red, 8 5 as was Davis'
case and two-thirds of the confession cases the Court has chosen
to review these past thirty years?
178. See 384 U.S. at 743 n.3; 339 F.2d at 779, 784 (dissenting opinion).
179. 221 F. Supp. at 496. "Not humanly possible," asserted the dissenting judges
in the Fourth Circuit, 339 F.2d at 784.
180. 339 F.2d at 775 (Haynsworth, J.).
181. Ibid.
182. 221 F. Supp. at 496.
183. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

184. Including Brown, the Court decided thirty-five state confession cases from
1936 through 1965. See National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Defender
Newsletter, Vol. II, no. 5, Sept. 1965.
185. See Paar Y AN, JR., DATH D THE Surnmp COURT 305 (1961).
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Analyzing a recent Supreme Court Term, a careful student of
that institution's work reported that the Court was asked to review
over 2,000 cases, of which forty-two involved the death penalty.
Although "all of the allegations in these capital cases were so serious
that the Supreme Court might have felt compelled to decide each
and every one of them" only one condemned man out of four received a hearing, and only one out of eight obtained a reversal. 88
How many garden-variety criminal defendants who cried "coerced
confession" but lost the "swearing contest" below were likely to survive the winnowing process above? As Justice Black put it in the
Miranda oral arguments, "if you are going to determine it [the admissibility of the confession] each time on the circumstances . . .
[if] this Court will take them one by one... it is more than we are
18 7
capable of doing.' 1
Immediately prior to Escobedo and Miranda,could we afford to
be proud of the progress we had made since the 1924 Ziang Sun
Wan case? On that occasion two lower federal courts upheld a confession obtained from a seriously ill Chinese who had been held
incommunicado for over a week, most of the time in a secluded
hotel room where he was questioned "morning, afternoon and evening (and at least on one occasion after midnight)."' 8 8 (The Government met a much cooler reception in the Supreme Court than it
had enjoyed in the lower courts when it depicted the case as
one in which the defendant "had voluntarily acquiesced in going to
the hotel; he had never complained of the presence of officers there
with him.., he had been in a good humor all the time about the
89
matter.")1
Had we made forty years worth of progress since the 1927 Doran
case where, despite a powerful dissent by Judge Lehman, joined by
Chief Judge Cardozo, what was probably the finest state court in
the land affirmed a murder conviction based on a confession elicited
from a man who had admittedly fainted during the "questioning,"
who had needed to be revived with whiskey and who admittedly
had been "talked to" by an officer wearing a boxing glove on his
hand?'" (A majority of the New York Court of Appeals, per Crane,
J., had speculated that "realization of the horrible deed which had
186. Id. at 297-98.
187. Unofficial Transcript of Oral Argument in Miranda and Companion Cases,

p. 91 (oral argument of Mr. Earle for petitioner in Vignera v. New York), on file in
University of Michigan Law Library.
188. 266 U.S. 1, 11 (1924).
189. Brief for the United States, p. 43.
190. 246 N.Y. 409, 422-23, 159 N.E. 379, 384 (1927).
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been committed and that at last he had been discovered" might
have caused the defendant to faint. 191 As for the boxing glove,
the majority conceded "this surely was a foolish thing for [the
officer] to do, but it was to be considered by the jury with all the
other testimony in determining the truth or falsity of Doran's state192
ment about the use of violence.")
True, this was a long time ago, but the lower federal courts in
Ziang Sun Wan and the state courts in Doran utilized a "voluntariness" test not much different from the one still being employed
at least by the lower courts in the 1960's.193 Could we confidently
assert that confessions obtained on Wan and Doran type facts would
never have passed muster in the lower courts in the '60's?
A short week after they paid their respects to the late "voluntariness" test, Justices Clark and Harlan would have applied it to
sustain Davis' confessions. The Court's reversal, they protested,
"goes against the grain of our prior decisions.' '1 94 "[T]he sporadic
interrogation of Davis," as they saw it, "can hardly be denominated
as sustained or overbearing pressure. From the record it appears
that he was simply questioned for about an hour each day [for sixteen days] by a couple of detectives. There was no protracted
grilling. Nor did the police operate in relays."' 195
"Disagreement," said Justice Harlan of the "voluntariness"
test, "is usually confined to that borderland of close cases where
it matters least."' 9 6 After three decades and thirty-odd "coerced"
confession cases which saw "the overall gauge.., steadily changing,
usually in the direction of restricting admissibility,"' 9 7 was Davis
still a "close case"? If so, was the need to scrap the "voluntariness"
test still a close question?
191. Id. at 422.
192. Id. at 423.

193. Since the Wan jury was told that "in determining whether or not said confessions or admissions were voluntary" it "may take into consideration" that "the
defendant was not warned that the confessions would or might be used against him
or that he was not obliged to make any incriminating statement," that "the police
repeatedly questioned him and importuned him to talk about the case" and other
specific factors (Brief for the United States, p. 51), these instructions seem superior
to those given in Haynes, some forty years later. See discussion in text at notes
149-51 supra. I am aware that Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) required the
trial court to actually determine the issue of "coercion" or "voluntariness" himself,
at least in the first instance, but presumably how a judge instructs a jury on an
issue is some evidence of how he himself would go about resolving that issue.
194. 384 U.S. at 753.
195. Id. at 754-55.
196. 384 U.S. at 509.
197. Id. at 508.
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